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Romer v. Evans: "Terminal Silliness," or Enlightened
Jurisprudence?
But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is
in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citi-
zens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution ... neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of
civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.1
Justice Harlan delivered the above admonition in his famous
dissent to Plessy v. Ferguson.2 By resurrecting this language in the
1996 opinion Romer v. Evans,3 the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the loathsome specter of discrimination still hovers over this
country one hundred years after Justice Harlan's enlightened insight.
But not all agree that sexual orientation-the classification at issue in
Romer-merits the same legal protections as race. Nor do all agree
that Colorado Constitutional Amendment 2-the target of the Su-
preme Court's review-deprived homosexuals of anything more than
preferential treatment.
Amendment 2 was a response to ordinances passed in several of
Colorado's municipalities which banned discrimination based upon
sexual orientation in housing, employment, education, public ac-
commodations, and health and welfare services.4 The Amendment
stated:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bi-
sexual Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through
any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies,
political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or other-
wise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons
1. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
2. See id. at 552-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Plessy held that a law requiring separate
but equal accommodations for blacks and whites in railway coaches did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 548.
3. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
4. See id. at 1623 (citing ASPEN, COLO., MUNICIPAL CODE § 13-98 (1977);
BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE §§ 12-1-1 to 12-1-11 (1987); DENVER, COLO., REV.
MUNICIPAL CODE art. IV, §§ 28-91 to 28-116 (1991)).
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to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination. This section of
the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing
On November 3, 1993, Colorado voters approved the Amendment
by a vote of 813,966 (53.4%) to 710,151 (46.6%).6
The issue at stake in Romer was whether Amendment 2 violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 In a
six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court held that it did violate the
Equal Protection Clause because: (1) "A law declaring that in gen-
eral it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all
others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal pro-
tection of the laws in the most literal sense," and (2) the Amendment
did not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.8 In
dissent, Justice Scalia countered by arguing that Amendment 2 did
nothing more than "prohibit[] special treatment of homosexuals" 9 and
that it rationally furthered the legitimate state interest of
"preserv[ing] traditional sexual mores."'"
This Note first summarizes the precedent for equal protection
analysis." It then outlines the events giving rise to Romer" and ex-
amines the majority's analysis as well as Justice Scalia's
counterarguments. 3 Next, the Note reviews background cases in-
volving the constitutional rights of homosexuals.' 4 It then analyzes
the strengths and weaknesses of the majority's reasoning" and as-
sesses Romer's impact on gay rights and constitutional jurisprudence
in general.
6
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
5. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, held unconstitutional by Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct.
1620 (1996).
6. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Colo. 1994), affd on other grounds, 116
S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
7. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628-29. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion which
was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See id. at 1623.
9. Id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
joined Justice Scalia's dissent. See id. at 1623.
10. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11. See infra notes 17-59 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 71-128 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 129-77 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 178-291 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 292-314 and accompanying text.
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provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.",17 The Supreme Court has
determined that this clause "is essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike."18  Generally speaking,
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenges may derive
from state legislative acts'9 or from state constitutional provisions, °
as was the case in Romer.2' The Court has developed three levels of
judicial review for equal protection challenges: strict scrutiny, inter-
mediate scrutiny, and rational review.22
Courts apply the highest level of review, strict scrutiny, when a
legal classification either encroaches upon a fundamental right or
targets a suspect class.2 Fundamental rights are rights "explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the [United States] Constitution., 24  Such
rights include interstate travel,2 privacy,26 First Amendment guaran-
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Equal protection claims against the federal gov-
emnment arise under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, see U.S. CONST. amend.
V ("[N]or shall any person... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .... "), into which the Court has read an implicit Equal Protection Clause, see
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) ("[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no
equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be viola-
tive of due process.'" (quoting Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954))); Charles C.
Steward Machinery Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937) (stating in dicta "that discrimi-
nation, if gross enough, is ... subject under the Fifth Amendment to challenge"). The
"Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely
the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment." Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,638 n.2 (1975).
18. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,439 (1985).
19. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (upholding against
an equal protection challenge an Oklahoma state statute that regulated the dispensation of
eyeglasses).
20. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 471 (1991) (applying rational relation
review to a state constitutional provision).
21. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623.
22. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-42 (describing the three levels of review).
23. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450,457-58 (1988).
24. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). These are
rights "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice
would exist if [they] were sacrificed.'" Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986)
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (alteration in original)). An-
other characterization is that fundamental rights are " 'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition.'" Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977)). The Court does not create these rights; it merely recognizes that they are
"explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-34.
25. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) ("[T]he nature of our
Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all
citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by
statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.").
26. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that the mar-
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tees,27 and participation in state elections on an equal basis with
other voters.28 Since the 1970s, however, the Supreme Court has
been reluctant to recognize new fundamental rights.29 For example,
it has refused to recognize a fundamental right to education, 0 hous-
ing,31 welfare payments,3 2 or government employment.3
Suspect classes are those classes whose members historically
have "been subjected to discrimination," "exhibit obvious, immuta-
ble, or distinguishing characteristics," and are "a minority or
politically powerless."3 ' Additionally, members of suspect classes
exhibit identifying characteristics that are beyond their control3" and
experience discrimination for characteristics that are "not truly in-
dicative of their abilities. 36 As a result, members of suspect classes
riage relationship falls within the "zone of privacy created by several fundamental consti-
tutional guarantees").
27. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968) ("[T]his freedom [of asso-
ciation] protected against federal encroachment by the First Amendment is entitled under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the same protection from infringement by the States.").
28. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Court stated:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal participation
by all voters in the election of state legislators. Diluting the weight of votes be-
cause of place of residence impairs basic constitutional rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment just as much as invidious discriminations based upon fac-
tors such as race or economic status.
Id. at 566 (citation omitted).
29. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-34 (announcing that the Court will only recognize a
right as fundamental if it is "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution");
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 900 n.5 (2d ed. 1991) ("Since 1973
the Court has generally adhered to the Rodriguez reformulation [of the fundamental rights
test]. That is, although the Court has continued to enforce 'fundamental' interest analysis
in the areas of procreation, voting, access to the courts, and travel, it has essentially frozen
the list of 'fundamental' interests .... "); see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195 ("There should
be ... great resistance to expand the substantive reach of [the Due Process Clause], par-
ticularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental.").
30. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35 ("Education, of course, is not among the rights af-
forded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for
saying it is implicitly so protected.").
31. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56,74 (1972) ("We are unable to perceive ... any
constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality .... ).
32. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (holding that there was no
basis for applying a standard other than the rational basis test in determining whether a
Maryland statute capping monthly welfare grants violated the Equal Protection Clause).
33. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per
curiam) ("This Court's decisions give no support to the proposition that a right of govern-
mental employment per se is fundamental.").
34. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986).
35. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216 n.14 (1982).
36. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313. The "Supreme Court has never articulated a precise test
for determining which groups should be regarded as suspect or quasi-suspect." Equality
Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 434 (S.D. Ohio 1994). The lack of a precise
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"command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process., 37 The Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny to suspect
classifications based on alienage, race, and ancestry" because these
classifications are likely to reflect prejudice and are unlikely to soon
be rectified by the legislative process. 39 The Court has declined to
apply strict scrutiny to classifications based on age4" or familial rela-
tionship.41 Once a law has been shown to affect a fundamental right
or a suspect class, in order to survive strict scrutiny, it must serve a
compelling state interest, and it must be narrowly tailored to serve
the state interest in the least restrictive manner possible.42
Intermediate scrutiny, which falls somewhere between strict
test is evidenced by the "stereotype" requirement in Murgia not being mentioned in Lyng.
Compare Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313 (defining suspect classes as those which have
"experienced a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment' or been subjected to unique dis-
abilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities"
(quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973))), with Lyng,
477 U.S. at 638 (characterizing suspect classes as those which have historically "been sub-
jected to discrimination ... [and which] exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing
characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and are ... a minority or politically
powerless" (citing Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313-14)).
37. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
3M See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); see also
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) ("[T]he Court's decisions have estab-
lished that classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny." (footnotes omitted)); Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) ("Classifications based solely upon race must be scruti-
nized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence
constitutionally suspect."); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)
("Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.").
39. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. Classifications on these bases are "suspect" be-
cause they "tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal" and "are more likely than
others to reflect deep-seated prejudice." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14. Furthermore,
"[l]egislation predicated on such prejudice is easily recognized as incompatible with the
constitutional understanding that each person is to be judged individually and is entitled to
equal justice under the law." Id.
40. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313 (declining to find that the aged meet the characteris-
tics of a suspect class).
41. See Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638-43 (judging, in the context of the federal food stamp
program, that Congress could rationally classify according to whether household members
were close or distant relatives, and that close relatives-that is, parents, children, and sib-
lings-are not members of a suspect or quasi-suspect class).
42. See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217. An alternative formulation of the strict scrutiny
test is that the classification must be "necessary" to promote a compelling state interest.
See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972). In Dunn, the Court clarified that
"legal 'tests' do not have the precision of mathematical formulas" and that "[t]he key
words emphasize a matter of degree: that a heavy burden of justification is on the State,
and that the statute will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purposes." Id. at 342-
43.
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scrutiny and rational review, has been applied in cases involving dis-
criminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.43 Groups
which garner intermediate scrutiny are known as quasi-suspect
classes." The Supreme Court has declined to apply intermediate re-
view to classifications based on age,45 mental retardation,46 or familial
relationship. The Court has never explicitly distinguished between
the characteristics of suspect and quasi-suspect classes.48 Neverthe-
43. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988). Intermediate
scrutiny is reserved for "statutes distributing benefits and burdens between the sexes in
different ways [because they] very likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabili-
ties of men and women." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441; see also Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 & n.10 (1982) (stating that objectives are illegitimate when
they reflect stereotypic notions of gender roles); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99
(1976) (discussing outdated stereotypes of gender classifications). Classifications based on
illegitimacy also receive intermediate scrutiny because illegitimacy "is beyond the individ-
ual's control and bears 'no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and
contribute to society.'" Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495,505 (1976)).
The Court recently applied what it called "skeptical scrutiny" to classifications based
on gender. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996). The Court stressed
that "gender-based government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justi-
fication,'" id. (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724), and that the burden is on the State to
prove that the classification is substantially related to important governmental objectives,
see id. The Court further held that the justification cannot be hypothetical and "must not
rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of
males and females." Id. at 2275. Justice Scalia, in dissent, criticized the Court for
"effectively" applying strict scrutiny. See id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. See, e.g., Murgia, 427 U.S. at 325 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
45. See id. at 312-14. After declining to find that the aged were a suspect class, see id.
at 312-13, the Court proceeded to apply rational basis review without considering whether
they might be a quasi-suspect class, see id. at 314.
46. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-47 (finding that the mentally retarded have charac-
teristics which truly are indicative of their abilities, and that they benefit from favorable
legislation and are not politically powerless).
47. See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (holding, without elaboration, that
close relatives do not meet any of the elements of a suspect or quasi-suspect class).
48. See Evans v. Romer, No. CIV.A.92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 518586, at *12 (City &
County of Denver, Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993) (unpublished trial court decision) ("Case
law has not clearly differentiated between the elements of a 'suspect' class and a 'quasi-
suspect' class."), aff'd, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), aff'd on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1620
(1996). Murgia suggests that there is not a difference-the Court did not even consider
whether a classification based on age was quasi-suspect once it determined that the classi-
fication was not suspect. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314. In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982), the Court characterized classifications which disadvantage a suspect class as
"presumptively invidious." Id. at 216. It then noted that "certain forms of legislative clas-
sification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional
difficulties," and that it is in these situations that intermediate scrutiny should be applied.
Id. at 217. Thus, "[o]nly when concerns sufficiently absolute and enduring can be clearly
ascertained from the Constitution and our cases do we employ this [intermediate] standard
to aid us in determining the rationality of the legislative choice." Id. at 218 n.16.
1997] COLORADO AMENDMENT 2 1897
less, like members of suspect classes, members of quasi-suspect
classes historically must have "been subjected to discrimination,"
"exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics," and
be "a minority or politically powerless."4 9 Also, like suspect classes,
members of quasi-suspect classes face discrimination for possessing
characteristics beyond their control which are not truly indicative of
their abilities." A legal classification affecting a quasi-suspect class
must be substantially related to an important government interest to
withstand intermediate scrutiny.51
The least rigorous level of review is the rational basis test.52
49. Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638.
50. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441. Akin to the Court not having differentiated be-
tween suspect and quasi-suspect classes, the Court has not definitively articulated the
characteristics of a quasi-suspect class. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW § 16-33, at 1614 (2d ed. 1988).
51. See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217-18 ("[I]n these limited circumstances we have
sought the assurance that the classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with
the ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be viewed as furthering a
substantial interest of the State."); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)
("[C]lassifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.").
52. Some courts have distinguished between the traditional rational basis review and
an "active" rational basis review, which involves a somewhat heightened application of the
rational basis test. See, e.g., United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1995)
(Calabresi, J., concurring) ("Judges and commentators have noted that the usually defer-
ential 'rational basis' test has been applied with greater rigor in some contexts, particularly
those in which courts have had reason to be concerned about possible discrimination.");
Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 1991) ("It is true that we found the dis-
crimination against homosexuals in... [a prior] case to have a rational basis, but it is clear
that we applied the type of 'active' rational basis review employed by the Supreme Court
in [Cleburne]." (citation omitted)). The genesis of this distinction was Justice Marshall's
opinion in Cleburne, in which he argued that the Court applied a stricter rational basis test
than it had in the past. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 458-60 (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court implicitly adopted a
"second order" level of scrutiny). Justice Marshall took issue with the Court's statement
that the record did not reveal a rational basis for the ordinance at issue; he argued that
under rational basis review the Court does not sift through the record in order to find a
factual foundation for policy decisions. See id. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). Additionally, although he shared concerns with
the majority over the ordinance's imprecise classifications, Justice Marshall asserted that
"[i]n normal circumstances, the burden is not on the legislature to convince the Court that
the lines it has drawn are sensible; legislation is presumptively constitutional." Id. at 459
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Despite Justice Marshall's contentions and subsequent references by lower courts to
"active" rational basis review, the Supreme Court has never recognized such a distinction.
See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1993). In Heller, the Supreme Court discussed
rational basis scrutiny and stated that its correct application includes: a presumption of
constitutional validity, a burden on the plaintiff, and a lack of need for the record to pro-
vide a supportive basis for the legislation. See id. The Court did not endorse varying
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When no protected rights or classes are involved, legislation "will be
sustained [against equal protection challenge] if the classification
drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state inter-
est."53 The rational basis test "is not a license for courts to judge the
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices."54 Rather, courts
merely must determine whether there is "any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classifica-
tion."55 Furthermore, "the Constitution presumes that, absent some
reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually
be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention
is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely [the Court] may
think a political branch has acted. 5 6 As a result, when the Court ap-
plies the rational basis test, the legislative classification "is accorded
a strong presumption of validity,"57 and "'[t]he burden is on the one
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable
basis which might support it,' whether or not the basis has a founda-
tion in the record." ' Finally, a classification does not fail because it
is imperfectly drawn or results in some inequality. 9
In Romer, nine days after Amendment 2 passed, nine homosex-
ual individuals joined with the City and County of Denver, the City
of Boulder, the City of Aspen, the City Council of Aspen, and a
Boulder Valley School District and filed suit in the District Court for
the City and County of Denver to enjoin Amendment 2's enforce-
ment, claiming that it was unconstitutional." After rejecting a
request for an expedited hearing on the merits, the court granted a
levels of rational basis scrutiny and specifically stated that Cleburne did not "apply a dif-
ferent standard of rational-basis review from that just described." Id. at 321. For a
discussion of "active" rational basis review and whether it has survived Heller, see Alfonso
Madrid, Comment, Rational Basis Review Goes Back to the Dentist's Chair: Can the
Toothless Test of Heller v. Doe Keep Gays in the Military?, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 167, 183-209 (1994).
53. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
54. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,313 (1993).
55. Id.
56. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,97 (1979) (footnote omitted).
57. Heller, 509 U.S. at 319.
58. Id. at 320-21 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356,364
(1973) (citation omitted)).
59. See id at 321.
60. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993). The challenges to
Amendment 2 were based upon claims under the First Amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution; the Equal Protection, Due Process, Supremacy, and Guarantee Clauses of the
Federal Constitution; and various provisions of the Colorado Constitution. See id. at 1272-
73 & n.2. The defendants in the suit were Roy Romer in his official capacity as governor,
the Colorado Attorney General, and the State of Colorado. See id. at 1270.
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preliminary injunction based upon the plaintiffs' arguments that
Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.6' The defendants appealed to the Colorado
Supreme Court,62 which upheld the preliminary injunction.63  The
state supreme court determined that a fundamental right to partici-
pate equally in the political process exists and that Amendment 2
infringed upon this right; hence, the state court ruled that the
Amendment would be subject to strict scrutiny review on remand. '
On remand, the trial court applied strict scrutiny in accordance
with the standard set forth by the Colorado Supreme Court:
Amendment 2 would "be sustained only if [it were] supported by a
compelling state interest and narrowly drawn to achieve that interest
61. See id. at 1273. The plaintiffs supported their motion for a preliminary injunction
by arguing that Amendment 2 deprived them of their rights of free expression and equal
protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, respectively, to the Federal Con-
stitution. See id. The trial court, however, did not rely on the First Amendment argument
in granting the preliminary injunction. See id.
62. The defendants appealed pursuant to a Colorado appellate rule which allows an
appeal from "[a]n order granting or denying a temporary injunction." COLO. APP. R.
1(a)(3). The Colorado Supreme Court granted review. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1274.
63. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1286.
64. See id. The court derived this fundamental right to equal participation in the po-
litical process from an amalgam of Supreme Court cases involving reapportionment, see id.
at 1276 (citing Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964) (striking
down reapportionment scheme under Equal Protection Clause); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 567-68 (1964) (reapportionment); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964)
(reapportionment)), minority party rights, see id. (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
34 (1968) (finding impermissible restriction on minority political party's right to political
participation)), direct restrictions on voting, see id. (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 336 (1972) (finding impermissible infringement on fundamental right to vote);
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969) (fundamental right to
vote); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-68 (1966) (fundamental right
to vote)), and attempts to limit the ability of certain groups to implement desired legisla-
tion through the normal political processes, see id. (citing Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 469-70 (1982) (invalidating on Equal Protection grounds attempts to
limit political participation by certain groups); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1971)
(certain groups); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1969) (certain groups)). The
Colorado Supreme Court reasoned that Amendment 2 infringed on the fundamental right
to equal participation in the political process
because it bar[red] gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals from having an effective
voice in governmental affairs insofar as those persons deem it beneficial to seek
legislation that would protect them from discrimination based on their sexual ori-
entation. Amendment 2 alter[ed] the political process so that a targeted class
[was] prohibited from obtaining legislative, executive, and judicial protection or
redress from discrimination absent the consent of a majority of the electorate
through the adoption of a constitutional amendment.
Id. at 1285. In short, the state supreme court found that Amendment 2 "single[d] out and
prohibit[ed] this class of persons from seeking governmental action favorable to it." Id.
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in the least restrictive manner possible., 65 The six state interests of-
fered by the defendants at trial were:
1) deterring factionalism; 2) preserving the integrity of the
state's political functions; 3) preserving the ability of the
State to remedy discrimination against suspect classes;
4) preventing the government from interfering with per-
sonal, familial and religious privacy; 5) preventing
government from subsidizing the political objectives of a
special interest group; and 6) promoting the physical and
psychological well-being of our children.
The trial court, however, found only two of the proffered interests
compelling-"the promotion of religious freedom and the promotion
of family privacy"-but it stated that "[a]s to those two interests the
Amendment [wa]s not 'narrowly drawn to achieve th[ose] purpose[s]
in the least restrictive manner possible.' ,67
The court also determined that homosexuals were not a suspect
or quasi-suspect class.68 Nevertheless, because Amendment 2 in-
65. Id. at 1275 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,217 (1982)).
66. Evans v. Romer, No. CIV.A.92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 518586, at *2 (City & County
of Denver, Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993) (unpublished trial court decision), aff'd, 882 P.2d
1335 (Colo. 1994), aff'd on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
67. Id. at *9 (quoting Evans, 854 P.2d at 1275). The court suggested that a narrower
way to protect religious freedom would be to add religious exemptions to ordinances which
ban discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, rather than adopting a broad-based
amendment which denies gays their fundamental right to participate in the political proc-
ess. See id. at *7. As for the compelling interest of family privacy, the defendants failed to
show "[t]he tie-in between the interest of protecting the family and denying gays and bi-
sexuals the right to political participation." Id. at *8.
The court found that the other proffered interests were not even compelling. Deter-
ring factionalism was not a compelling state interest because this country's history and
policies encourage differing opinions on political questions. See id. at *3. Furthermore, it
stated that preserving the integrity of Colorado's political functions was not compelling
because the people's right to amend their state constitution was limited by the United
States Constitution. See id. at *4-*5. Also, preserving Colorado's ability to remedy dis-
crimination against suspect classes was not compelling because evidence showed that
protection for homosexuals would not increase costs or impair the enforcement of other
civil rights statutes or ordinances. See id. at *5-*6. Moreover, the court found fiscal con-
cerns to be unpersuasive in light of the importance of protecting fundamental rights. See
id. at *6. Finally, as to the other proffered interests of personal privacy, preventing the
government from subsidizing the political objectives of a special interest group, and pro-
moting the physical and psychological well-being of children, the court found that the
defendants did not support their existence with sufficient evidence. See id. at *8-*9.
68. See id. at *10-*12. When the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
injunction and remanded the case on the fundamental right issue, it "was unaware that
plaintiffs were seeking suspect class status." Id. at *9. The trial court denied a motion in
limine by the defendants to exclude evidence relating to whether homosexuals are a sus-
pect or quasi-suspect class. See id. at *10. In its conclusions of law, the trial court outlined
the requirements for a suspect or quasi-suspect class, stating that "homosexuals must 1)
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fringed upon a fundamental right without narrowly serving a com-
pelling state interest, the trial court found that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause and ordered that the preliminary injunction be
made permanent. 9 The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's order on appeal."
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Colorado Su-
preme Court's judgment, "but on a rationale different from that
adopted by the State Supreme Court., 71 The Court began its analysis
have suffered a history of discrimination; 2) exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing
characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and 3) show that they are a minority
or politically powerless." Id. (citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602-03 (1987)).
The court found that homosexuals constitute no more than 4% of the population but
gained the support of 46% of Colorado voters against Amendment 2. See id. at *12. Also,
the court found that "gays and bisexuals though small in number are skilled at building
coalitions which is a key to political power." Id. The court consequently held that
"[h]omosexuals fail[ed] to meet the element of political powerlessness and therefore
fail[ed] to meet the elements to be found to be a suspect class." Id. The court also held
that plaintiffs failed to distinguish the elements of a quasi-suspect class and that they sub-
sequently failed to carry the burden of establishing that homosexuals are a quasi-suspect
class. See id. These rulings were not appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court. See Evans
v, Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1341 n.3 (Colo. 1994), affd on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1620
(1996).
69. See Evans v. Romer, No. CIV.A.92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 518586, at *13 (City &
County of Denver, Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993) (unpublished trial court decision), aff'd,
882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), affd on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). Although the
plaintiffs requested that the court apply rational review as well, the court declined to do so
because the legally appropriate standard, as determined by the Colorado Supreme Court,
was strict scrutiny. See id. at *12.
70. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1350 (Colo. 1994), aff'd on other grounds, 116
S. Ct. 1620 (1996). The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the "compelling" interests
examined by the trial court, with the exception of the "children's well-being" interest,
which was not reasserted on appeal. See id. at 1339-40 & n.2. The state supreme court
essentially came to the same conclusions as the trial court, see id. at 1342-49, but the su-
preme court recognized that "personal privacy" might be a compelling state interest if
understood to mean the right of preserving "associational privacy," id. at 1344. Never-
theless, it held that Amendment 2 was not narrowly tailored to serve this interest because
it "affect[ed] a vast array of affiliations which in no way implicate associational privacy,"
such as business affiliations. Id. The court suggested that a less restrictive way to protect
this interest would be to exempt certain intimate associations from the anti-discrimination
laws. See id. at 1345. It offered as an example allowing landlords "to discriminate against
homosexuals in the rental of owner-occupied housing." Id.
The court also ruled that the additional interest of public morality was properly before
it, see id. at 1346 n.11, but that "[a]t the most, this interest is substantial" rather than com-
pelling, id. at 1347. Furthermore, the court said that "even recognizing the legitimacy of
promoting public morals as a governmental interest,... Amendment 2 is not necessary to
preserve heterosexual families, marriage, or to express disapproval of gay men, lesbians,
and bisexuals." Id.
71. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624. The Court never explicitly stated that the Colorado
Supreme Court was incorrect in its holding "that Amendment 2 was subject to strict scru-
tiny under the Fourteenth Amendment because it infringed on the fundamental right of
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by rejecting the State's principal argument that Amendment 2 merely
deprived homosexuals of special rights 2 It rejected this reading as
"implausible" based upon "the authoritative construction of Colo-
rado's Supreme Court" as to the immediate and ultimate effects of
the Amendment.' The Colorado Supreme Court had found that the
immediate effect of Amendment 2 would be to repeal existing local
and state statutes, ordinances, policies, and regulations which pro-
hibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation7 4 and that the
ultimate effect would be to prohibit any governmental entity from
adopting similar measures in the future without first amending the
state constitution.75 Based on the state court's understanding of
Amendment 2's immediate and ultimate effects, the United States
Supreme Court found that "[h]omosexuals, by state decree, are put
in a solitary class with respect to transactions and relations in both
the private and governmental spheres."76 The Court next determined
that "[t]he amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others,
specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination,
and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies."" Further-
gays and lesbians to participate in the political process." Id. (citing Evans, 854 P.2d at
1282-84). It did not declare, however, that such a right is fundamental, and it applied a
rational relation review rather than a strict scrutiny review. See id. at 1627-29; cf. id. at
1631 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court implicitly rejects the Colorado Supreme
Court's holding that Amendment 2 infringes upon a 'fundamental right' of 'independently
identifiable class[es]' to 'participate equally in the political process.'" (quoting id. at 1624
(citation omitted) (second alteration in original))); infra notes 205-13 (discussing the ma-
jority's equal protection analysis and its failure to address whether Amendment 2
burdened a fundamental right).
72. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624.
73. Id.
74. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1284-85 & n.6. These repeals would include the Aspen,
Boulder, and Denver anti-discrimination ordinances, an executive order prohibiting dis-
crimination against state employees based upon sexual orientation, a provision of the
Colorado Insurance Code prohibiting insurers from discriminating based upon the in-
sured's sexual orientation, and sexual orientation antidiscrimination policies of the
Metropolitan State College of Denver and Colorado State University. See id.
75. See id. at 1285.
76. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1625.
77. Id. In support of this conclusion, the Court examined the Amendment's "far-
reaching" change in the legal status of gays "when considered in light of the structure and
operation of modem anti-discrimination laws." Id. at 1625. The Court illustrated this
structure by outlining the history of "contemporary statutes and ordinances prohibiting
discrimination by providers of public accommodations." Id. At common law, those who
served the public could not refuse to serve a customer "'without good reason.'" Id.
(quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 115
S. Ct. 2338, 2346 (1995)). Because these "rules ... proved insufficient," and because Con-
gress did not have "a general power to prohibit discrimination in public accommodations"
under the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883), states responded with "detailed statu-
tory schemes." Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1625. These statutes specify the groups or persons
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more, the Court observed that although "[i]t is a fair, if not neces-
sary, inference from the broad language of the amendment that it
deprives gays and lesbians even of the protection of general laws and
policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental and
private settings,"" the elimination of specific laws alone was suffi-
cient to refute the argument that Amendment 2 only involved special
rights: 9
To the contrary, the amendment imposes a special disability
on these persons alone. Homosexuals are forbidden the
safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without con-
straint. They can obtain specific protection against
discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to
amend the state constitution .... 80
The Court found "nothing special in the protections Amendment 2
withholds" because such protections are "taken for granted by most
people either because they already have them or do not need
them."8
After determining that Amendment 2 did not merely deprive
homosexuals of special rights, the majority began its equal protection
analysis. 2 Without mentioning the Colorado Supreme Court's find-
ing that Amendment 2 burdened a fundamental right, the majority
simply declared that Amendment 2 "fails, indeed defies, even th[e]
conventional [rational basis] inquiry."83 The majority grounded this
who are under a duty not to discriminate as well as the groups or persons protected from
discrimination. See id. Colorado's statutes were typical of these schemes and offered
heightened protection against discrimination for traits such as "age, military status, marital
status, pregnancy, parenthood, custody of a minor child, political affiliation, physical or
mental disability ... and, in recent times, sexual orientation." Id. at 1626. Thus, Amend-
ment 2 had the "severe consequence" of "bar[ring] homosexuals from securing protection
against the injuries that these public-accommodations laws address." Id. However, the
Court noted that the consequences were even more severe because the Amendment would
also eliminate "protections for [homosexuals] in all transactions in housing, sale of real
estate, insurance, health and welfare services, private education, and employment." Id.
Furthermore, Amendment 2 would operate in the government sector as well, eliminating
protections such as those prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
state government employment and state colleges. See id.
78. Id. at 1626 (emphasis added).
79. See id. at 1626-27.
80. Id. at 1627.
81. Id
82. See id.
83. Id. The Court acknowledged that the constitutional guarantee of equal protection
often conflicts with the reality that most legislation classifies individuals or groups to some
extent, with resulting disadvantage to some who are thereby affected. See id. Thus,
throughout its equal protection jurisprudence, the Court has "attempted to reconcile the
principle with the reality by stating that, if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
1997] 1903
1904 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75
conclusion on two related bases:
First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing
a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named
group, an exceptional and ... invalid form of legislation.
Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the rea-
sons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable
by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it
lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.84
As for enactments which impose a disability on a single group,
the Court acknowledged that, under rational relation scrutiny, it had
sustained laws which were seemingly unwise or disadvantageous to a
particular group, but the Court stated that the laws in those cases
"were narrow enough in scope and grounded in a sufficient factual
context" to justify a rational relationship.' Amendment 2, however,
was "at once too narrow and too broad" because "it identifie[d] per-
sons by a single trait and then denie[d] them protection across the
board," and as a result, it "confound[ed] this normal process of judi-
cial review.86 Furthermore, the Court observed that the resulting
inability of a class to seek legal redress was unprecedented in its ju-
risprudence." Thus, the Court concluded: "A law declaring that in
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a
rational relation to some legitimate end." Id. For a discussion of the Court's three-tiered
equal protection analysis, see supra notes 17-59 and accompanying text.
84. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627. The first basis may more accurately be described as a
reason for Amendment 2 being a "per se" violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See
infra notes 265-76 and accompanying text.
85. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627. In support of this point, the Court cited City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 304-05 (1976) (per curiam) (finding that classification
allowing pushcart vendors but banning other street vendors was rationally related to city's
aim of promoting tourism), Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (finding
statute that disadvantaged opticians and favored optometrists was rationally related to
legitimate state interest in health and safety), Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York,
336 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1949) (upholding legislation which banned advertisements on vehi-
cles but nonetheless allowed vehicle owners to advertise on their own vehicles as rationally
related to the aim of traffic safety), and Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners,
330 U.S. 552, 563-64 (1947) (upholding state scheme that allowed issuance of riverboat
pilot licenses only to those who had served six-month apprenticeship in Louisiana as ra-
tionally related to state aim of safety through a closely knit group of pilots). Under
rational relation review, the Court had previously stated that " 'it is up to legislatures, not
courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation.'" Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469 (1981) (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729
(1963)). Therefore, the classification merely needs to be reasonable. See id. at 464.
86. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
87. See id. The Court determined that Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), did not
provide precedent for Amendment 2, as argued by the dissent. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at
1628; cf. id. at 1635-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Davis as authority for an enactment
that goes "even further" than Amendment 2). In Davis, the Court upheld "an Idaho terri-
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general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all
others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal pro-
tection of the laws in the most literal sense."
As to the breadth of Amendment 2, the Court determined that
the Amendment was "too far removed" from the interests offered by
the State to survive rational basis review. 9 Moreover, the Court felt
that Amendment 2 could be explained only by animosity towards
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals." The Court cited precedent from De-
partment of Agriculture v. Moreno that" 'a bare... desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate govern-
mental interest.' ,91 As such, the Court could not discern a rational
relationship to any legitimate state interest and held that Amend-
ment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause.92
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, "vigorously" dissented, viewing Amendment 2 as "a modest
attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional
sexual mores" by means of a method "specifically approved by the
torial statute denying [convicted felons, the insane, and] Mormons, polygamists, and advo-
cates of polygamy the right to vote and hold office." Id. at 1628 (citing Davis, 133 U.S. at
347). The Court in Romer determined that "[t]o the extent Davis held that persons advo-
cating a certain practice may be denied the right to vote, it is no longer good law." Id.
(citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that a statute
violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments when it purports to punish for mere advo-
cacy)). The Romer Court also determined that it would be unlikely for Davis's holding-
denying voting rights based on status-to survive strict scrutiny. See id. (citing Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (holding that a statute which grants the right to vote
to some citizens but denies it to others must be necessary to promote a compelling state
interest)). Finally, the Court stated that the issue in Romer did not implicate Davis's de-
nial of voting rights to convicted felons. See id. (citing Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24,
56 (1974) (holding that it is not a violation of equal protection to deny the right to vote to
convicted felons who have completed their sentences and paroles)).
88. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628. In making this assertion, the Court relied on the propo-
sition that "[c]entral both to the rule of law and to our own Constitution's guarantee of
equal protection is the principle that government and each of its parts remain open on
impartial terms to all who seek its assistance." Id. Furthermore, the Court recited that
"'[e]qual protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of ine-
qualities.'" Id. (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950) (quoting Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948))).
89. Id. at 1629. The Court specifically mentioned a few of the interests offered by the
state: "The primary rationale the State offers for Amendment 2 is respect for other citi-
zens' freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who
have personal or religious objections to homosexuality. Colorado also cites its interest in
conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups." Id.
90. See id. at 1628.
91. Id. (quoting United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,534 (1973)).
92. See id. at 1629.
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Congress of the United States and by this Court., 93 Justice Scalia
presented four related rationales for his dissent: (1) Amendment 2
merely denies special rights;94 (2) Amendment 2 bears a rational rela-
tionship to a legitimate state interest;" (3) precedent supports
Amendment 2;96 and (4) the Supreme Court should refrain from
making policy decisions in matters of social or cultural controversy.97
Justice Scalia first established his premise that Amendment 2
"prohibits special treatment of homosexuals, and nothing more." 9
He criticized the majority for failing to appreciate the conclusion of
the Colorado Supreme Court that "'Amendment 2 is not intended
to have any effect on [existing anti-discrimination] legislation, but
seeks only to prevent the adoption of anti-discrimination laws in-
tended to protect gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.' "9' Thus, Justice
Scalia extrapolated that general laws prohibiting arbitrary discrimi-
nation "would continue to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
93. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The congressional approval referenced by Justice Scalia
involved Congress's requiring Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah to include
clauses forever prohibiting polygamy in their state constitutions as a precondition for being
admitted to statehood. See id. at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Arizona Enabling Act,
ch. 310, § 20,36 Stat. 557, 569 (1910); New Mexico Enabling Act, ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. 557,
558 (1910); Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335, § 3, 34 Stat. 267, 269 (1906); Utah Enabling
Act, ch. 138, § 3, 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1894)). "Thus, this 'singling out' of the sexual practices
of a single group for statewide, democratic vote-so utterly alien to our constitutional
system, the Court would have us believe-has not only happened, but has received the
explicit approval of the United States Congress." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see infra note
123 and accompanying text (noting Justice Scalia's assertion that Romer may render these
provisions unconstitutional). Justice Scalia cited Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 347
(1890), as support for his claim that the Court had also given its specific approval to Colo-
rado's attempt to preserve sexual mores. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1635 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); infra note 124 (discussing Justice Scalia's analysis of Davis).
94. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. See id. at 1631-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. See id. at 1634-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. See id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9& Id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1346 n.9 (Colo.
1994), aff'd on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (emphasis omitted)). The general
anti-discrimination laws that the Colorado Supreme Court stated were beyond the scope of
Amendment 2 were laws which "proscribefl discrimination against persons who are not
suspect classes, including discrimination based on age, marital or family status, veterans'
status, and for any legal, off-duty conduct such as smoking tobacco." Evans v. Romer, 882
P.2d 1335, 1346 n.9 (Colo. 1994), aff'd on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). The ma-
jority in Romer remarked that the Colorado Supreme Court's "limited observation ...
does not resolve the issue," Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626, and that it would still reject the
special rights argument even if homosexuals could find protection under general anti-
discrimination laws, see id. at 1626-27.
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homosexual conduct," even under Amendment 2.'00 As such, Justice
Scalia concluded that Amendment 2 only prohibited preferential
treatment for homosexuals.01
Based on this premise, Justice Scalia argued that Amendment 2
did not violate equal protection because the only denial of "equal
treatment" would be that homosexuals could gain "preferential
treatment" only by amending Colorado's constitution."' Thus, Jus-
tice Scalia reasoned, the majority's opinion stands for the absurd rule
that "one who is accorded equal treatment under the laws, but can-
not as readily as others obtain preferential treatment under the laws,
has been denied equal protection of the laws."'0 3 Justice Scalia char-
acterized this rule as achieving "terminal silliness."' 4 He stated:
"The central thesis of the Court's reasoning is that any group is de-
nied equal protection when, to obtain advantage (or, presumably, to
avoid disadvantage), it must have recourse to a more general and
hence more difficult level of political decisionmaking than others." '
From this interpretation of the majority's holding, he deduced that
such reasoning would result in a violation of equal protection any
time a higher level of governmental decision-making imposed a dis-
advantage or prohibited a benefit."
To illustrate his contention that the logical conclusion of the
majority's holding was preposterous, Justice Scalia offered the ex-
ample of a state law prohibiting municipalities from awarding
contracts to relatives of mayors or city council members. 7 Justice
Scalia observed that under such a law, relatives of municipal officials
would have to seek recourse from the state legislature in order to
obtain the advantage of a municipal contract, "unlike all other citi-
zens, who need only persuade the municipality. 1 8  Justice Scalia
100. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For example, homosexuals would
be protected by the State's insurance laws prohibiting discrimination unrelated to antici-
pated risk, but the State or a municipality could not require an insurer to ignore any risks
which may be distinctly associated with homosexuality. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If merely stating this alleged 'equal protection' viola-
tion does not suffice to refute it, our constitutional jurisprudence has achieved terminal
silliness.").
105. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 1630-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Such a higher level may be "the state
legislature rather than local government, or... the people at large in the state constitution
rather than the legislature." Id. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. See id. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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found it "unheard-of" and "ridiculous" that the majority's theory
might indeed "consider this a denial of equal protection" because an
identifiable group of individuals would have to "resort to a higher
decisionmaking level" in order to obtain privileges under the law. 9
To the contrary, he concluded that such a law would be "perfectly
reasonable" under rational relation scrutiny and that, similarly,
"there [was] no doubt of a rational basis for the substance of the
prohibition [Amendment 2] at issue here.""'
Exploring further the issue of whether Amendment 2 could
withstand rational basis review, Justice Scalia cited Bowers v. Hard-
wick,' which held that statutes criminalizing homosexual conduct do
not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2
Justice Scalia reasoned that if a state could criminalize homosexual
conduct under the Constitution, then surely it could "merely disfa-
voro" such conduct."3  He therefore concluded that "it is
constitutionally permissible for a State to adopt a provision not even
disfavoring homosexual conduct, but merely prohibiting all levels of
state government from bestowing special protections upon homosex-
ual conduct... 4
109. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Justice Scalia criticized the Court for not even mentioning
Bowers-"[t]he case most relevant to the issue before us today." Romer, 116 S. Ct. at
1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196; see also infra notes 136-57 and accompanying text
(reviewing Bowers).
113. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1631-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The respondents argued that Bowers would
not justify applying Amendment 2 to individuals who merely had a homosexual
"orientation" and did not engage in homosexual acts. See id. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Scalia countered with several arguments. First, he quoted the Colorado
Supreme Court's statement that "'Amendment 2 targets this class of persons based on
four characteristics: sexual orientation; conduct; practices; and relationships.... These
four characteristics are not truly severable from one another because each provides noth-
ing more than a different way of identifying the same class of persons.'" Id. at 1632
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added by dissent) (quoting Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d
1335, 1349-50 (Colo. 1994), affd on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)). Thus, Justice
Scalia asserted that Bowers answers all constitutional objections if orientation indeed does
not describe a distinct class, as the Colorado court suggested, but that other justifications
would be necessary if orientation is a separate classification. See id. at 1633 n.2 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Scalia argued that even if Amendment 2 applied to homosexual individuals
who did not engage in homosexual conduct, it would still survive rational relation review:
"If it is rational to criminalize the conduct, surely it is rational to deny special favor and
protection to those with a self-avowed tendency or desire to engage in the conduct." Id. at
1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Also, "a State 'does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
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Justice Scalia then focused on the "eminent reasonableness" of
the Amendment and the validity of "animus" towards homosexual
conduct, contending that Amendment 2 bears a rational relationship
to the legitimate state purpose of preserving traditional moral val-
ues."' Justice Scalia argued that "one could consider certain conduct
reprehensible-murder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to
animals-and could exhibit even 'animus' toward such conduct," and
still remain within the realm of constitutionality.16  Thus, "the only
source of 'animus' at issue ... [is] moral disapproval of homosexual-
ity, the same sort of moral disapproval that produced the centuries-
old criminal laws that we held constitutional in Bowers.
'
,1 7
Justice Scalia then criticized the majority's declaration that
Amendment 2 was unprecedented in the Court's constitutional tradi-
tion 8 and the majority's statement that "'[c]entral ... to our own
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that
government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to
all who seek its assistance.' ,,.9 Justice Scalia offered several exam-
ples to counter the above assertions: (1) the Eighteenth
Amendment, which "deprived those who drank alcohol not only of
the power to alter the policy of prohibition locally or through state
legislation, but even of the power to alter it through state constitu-
merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.'" Id. (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 (1970)).
Finally, Justice Scalia contended that the respondents' challenge was a facial chal-
lenge, which means that" 'the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid.'" Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). Justice Scalia maintained that because Amendment 2
was constitutional under Bowers as applied to those who engage in homosexual acts, the
facial challenge must fail. See id. at 1632-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. See id. at 1633-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also asserted that homosexuals can enjoy
favored status under Amendment 2 because they are senior citizens or members of racial
minorities, but not solely for being homosexual. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Further-
more, he argued that "the degree of hostility reflected by Amendment 2 is the smallest
conceivable," as Colorado is one of 25 states which have repealed their anti-sodomy stat-
utes. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, he contended that Colorado's repeal of its anti-
sodomy statute does not mean that the people of Colorado no longer feel that homosexu-
ality is morally wrong or socially harmful; it may simply reflect the belief that enforcement
of such laws is unduly intrusive upon citizens' privacy. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Hence, according to Justice Scalia, the people of Colorado passed Amendment 2 in order
to maintain their moral disapproval of homosexuality despite their repeal of the anti-
sodomy statute. See id. at 1634, 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. See id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 1627-28).
119. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting id. at 1628).
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tional amendment or federal legislation";120 (2) the Establishment
Clause and the Republican Form of Government Clause, which pre-
vent theocrats or monarchists, respectively, from instituting their
desired form of government "at the local, state, or federal statutory
level";' 2' (3) any state law that "prevents the adversely affected
group-whether drug addicts, or smokers, or gun owners, or motor-
cyclists-from changing the policy thus established in 'each of [the]
parts' of the State";2 2 (4) the state constitutions of Arizona, Idaho,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah, which still contain provisions
forever prohibiting polygamy;" and (5) a territorial statute denying
polygamists the right to vote, which the Supreme Court upheld as
constitutional in Davis v. Beason.1
24
In conclusion, Justice Scalia declared that the Court had
wrongly "take[n] sides in this culture war.... not only by inventing a
novel and extravagant constitutional doctrine, but even by verbally
disparaging as bigotry adherence to traditional attitudes."'1  These
closing remarks reflect the sentiments in Justice Scalia's opening sen-
tence that "[t]he Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of
120. Id. at 1634-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed
by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI).
121. Id. at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I and U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 4).
122. Id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1628).
123. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also ARIZ. CONST. art. XX, para. 2
("Polygamous or plural marriages, or polygamous cohabitation, are forever prohibited
within this State."); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4 ("Bigamy and polygamy are forever prohib-
ited in this state .... "); N.M. CONST. art. XXI, § 1 ("Polygamous or plural marriages and
polygamous cohabitation are forever prohibited."); OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 2
("Polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited."); UTAH CONST. art. III, § 1
("[P]olygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited."). Justice Scalia called these
examples "a much closer analogy" because they too involved "the effort by the majority of
citizens to preserve its view of sexual morality statewide, against the efforts of a geo-
graphically concentrated and politically powerful minority to undermine it." Romer, 116 S.
Ct. at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia indicated that the Court's decision ap-
pears to make these provisions unconstitutional because "[p]olygamists ... have been
'singled out' by these provisions for much more severe treatment than merely denial of
favored status; and that treatment can only be changed by achieving amendment of the
state constitutions." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333, 346-47 (1890)). Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that Davis was no longer
good law to the extent that it denied the franchise for mere advocacy of polygamy and was
still sound to the extent that it denied the right to vote to convicted felons. See id. at 1636
n.3. (Scalia, J., dissenting). As for the Court's assertion that the denial of the right to vote
based on status would be subject to strict scrutiny because voting is a fundamental right,
Justice Scalia contended that strict scrutiny was not applicable in the instant case because
it involved no fundamental right. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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spite."'26 Justice Scalia argued that the Court imposed the views of
an elite class upon the common people when it struck down
Amendment 2.127 As such, he concluded that the majority performed
"an act, not of judicial judgment, but of political will. 1 2
Prior to Romer, the Supreme Court had never examined a classi-
fication based on homosexuality under the Equal Protection Clause.
In Rowland v. Mad River Local School District,129 the Court denied
certiorari to a case concerning this issue. The case involved a school
district that suspended a high school guidance counselor, and even-
tually declined to renew her contract, because of her sexual
orientation.'13 A jury determined that the suspension and failure to
rehire were due to the counselor's statements regarding her bisexu-
ality."' It also found that her bisexuality neither affected her
performance as a counselor nor disrupted the school.' The magis-
trate found a violation of equal protection as well as free speech,'33
but the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff did not establish either
constitutional violation. 34  This case is notable because of Justice
Brennan's dissent to the denial of certiorari. He argued that the
court should grant certiorari "because determination of the appro-
priate constitutional analysis to apply in such a case continues to
puzzle lower courts and because this Court has never addressed the
issues presented."'
35
126. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The historical meaning of "Kulturkampf" refers
to the nationalist efforts of Otto von Bismarck from 1871 to 1878 to convince the largely
Catholic citizenry of the German empire to place their loyalty to the state above their
loyalty to the Roman Catholic church. See 2 JOHN P. MCKAY Er AL., A HISTORY OF
WESTERN SOCIETY 813-14 (3d ed. 1987). In modem usage, the term "Kulturkampf" gen-
erally refers to any struggle between civil government and religious authorities over social
policy. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1003 (3d
ed. 1992).
127. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also contrasted
the majority's views with the more "plebeian attitudes" of Congress, which has declined to
extend the protections of federal civil rights laws to homosexuals and specifically excluded
them from the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a) (1994) ("[H]omosexuality and bisexuality... are not disabilities
under this chapter.").
128. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
130. See id. at 446.
131. See id. at 447.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 448.
135. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1009 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan suggested that classifications based on sexual preference
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Four months after it denied certiorari in Rowland, the Supreme
Court decided Bowers v. Hardwick,136 in which it held that the sub-
stantive component of the Due Process Clause does not extend a
fundamental privacy right to homosexuals to engage in consensual
sodomy.37 The respondent was a homosexual man who had been
charged under Georgia's sodomy statute for consensually committing
a sexual act with another man.'38 The Eleventh Circuit held that the
Georgia statute was subject to strict scrutiny because it violated the
respondent's fundamental right to engage in homosexual activity, a
private and intimate association protected by the Ninth Amendment
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."9 The
Supreme Court reversed.4
The Court first stated that its line of cases conferring privacy141 141 141
rights in child rearing and education, family relationships, pro-
might well target a suspect class or impinge upon a fundamental right, see id. at 1014
(Brennan, J., dissenting), and noted several courts which had so held, see id. at 1015 & n.9
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 167
(4th Cir. 1976) (finding state university's discrimination against homosexual student or-
ganization to violate the First Amendment rights of free expression and association); Ben
Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 969, 973-77 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (finding
military policy requiring discharge of homosexuals to violate the First Amendment, Ninth
Amendment, and fundamental right to privacy); New York v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940,
942 n.6 (N.Y. 1980) (using strict scrutiny to find state criminal sodomy statute a violation
of equal protection)). Because the counselor's bisexuality did not interfere with the
school's operation, Justice Brennan doubted that the Sixth Circuit's ruling could be upheld
even under the rational basis standard of review. See id. at 1017 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
137. See id. at 191-92. This holding was in contrast to the Court's holding in its land-
mark case Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965), that there is a fundamental
right to heterosexual marital privacy.
138. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-88.
139. See Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. 186
(1986).
140. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196. The Supreme Court only addressed the due process
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, as the respondent did "not defend the judgment
below based on the Ninth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, or the Eighth
Amendment." Id. at 196 n.8.
141. Although a right of privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, "the
Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or
zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
(1973). This right "has some extension to activities relating to marriage, procreation, con-
traception, family relationships, and child rearing and education." Id. at 152-53 (citations
omitted).
142. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) ("[T]he Act of 1922
[requiring every parent or guardian to send a child between eight and sixteen years old to
a public school] unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390,400 (1923) (holding that a state statute, which would prohibit the teaching of any
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creation,1" marriage,' 5 contraception,'46 and abortion147 did not ex-
tend to homosexual sodomy.48 Thus, the Court found no precedent
for a fundamental right. 49
Next, the Court declined to announce a new fundamental
right.5 ' It described the nature of fundamental rights as "liberties
subject in a language other than English and the teaching of any language other than Eng-
lish to a student who had not completed the eighth grade, deprived teachers and parents of
liberty without due process of law).
143. The Court built precedent establishing privacy rights in family relationships upon
those cases which had established the same for child rearing and education. As the Court
stated in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944):
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obliga-
tions the state can neither supply nor hinder. And it is in recognition of this that
these decisions [Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Meyer v. Nebraska] have re-
spected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.
Id. at 166 (citations omitted).
144. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that state legislation
providing for the sterilization of habitual criminals violated the Equal Protection Clause,
and stating that procreation is "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race"
and that sterilization would "forever deprive[] [the individual] of a basic liberty").
145. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) ("[The marital] relationship
l[ies] within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guaran-
tees."). The Court further expanded this right in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967):
Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to our very
existence and survival. To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a
basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes ... is surely to de-
prive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law.
Id. at 12 (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541).
146. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.").
147. The Court established that the right of a woman to choose an abortion is funda-
mental in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973):
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's con-
cept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as
the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to
the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.
Id. at 153.
148. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986). The Court limited its ruling
to the constitutionality of the statute as applied to homosexual sodomy only. See id. at 188
n.2. A married heterosexual couple was also involved in the action, but the Eleventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's ruling that they did not have standing to bring the action
because they had not sustained, nor were in danger of sustaining, direct injury from en-
forcement of the statute. See id. This ruling was not appealed to the Supreme Court. See
id.
149. See id. at 191.
150. See id. The Court issued a stern warning that there should be "great resistance" to
find new fundamental rights because "[o]therwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself
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that are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither
liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed' ,,. or as
"liberties that are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion.' ,,152 Because homosexual sodomy was forbidden at common
law, as well as by most states when the Bill of Rights and the Four-
teenth Amendment were ratified, the Court found that neither of
these formulations established it as a fundamental right.
5 3
After declining to find a fundamental right and hence apply
strict scrutiny, the Court analyzed whether the sodomy statute had a
rational basis.54 It refuted Hardwick's argument that "majority sen-
timents about the morality of homosexuality" were an inadequate
rationale to support the law.55 The Court declared that "[t]he law
... is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws repre-
senting essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due
Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.', 56  Thus, the
Court upheld the statute."5
further authority to govern the country without express constitutional authority." Id. at
195.
151. Id. at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937)).
152. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503 (1977)).
153. See id2 at 192-93 & nn.5-6. Each of the original 13 states had laws forbidding sod-
omy when they ratified the Bill of Rights in 1791. See id. at 192 & n.5. In 1868, when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, 32 of 37 states had laws forbidding sodomy. See id.
at 192-93 & n.6. All 50 states outlawed sodomy until 1961, and at the time of the Court's
decision in 1986,24 of the states as well as the District of Columbia imposed criminal sanc-
tions for sodomy between consenting adults. See id. at 193-94. Since Bowers, three states
and the District of Columbia have repealed their sodomy statutes, leaving only twenty-one
states with such legislation. See Deb Price, New High Court Ruling Helps Compensate For
Past Injustices to Gays, DET. NEWS, June 28,1996, at B1.
The fact that the conduct occurred in the privacy of a home did not change the result
of the case. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195. The Court distinguished Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment protected the viewing of obscene
materials in the privacy of one's home), as a First Amendment case and stated its reluc-
tance to start down the slippery slope of immunizing otherwise illegal conduct simply
because it occurs in the home. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195.
154. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id. Justice Powell, who was the swing vote in Bowers, concurred in the major-
ity opinion but wrote separately to emphasize that the lengthy prison sentences imposed
by many sodomy statutes could present serious Eighth Amendment issues. See id. at 197
(Powell, J., concurring). Interestingly, after Justice Powell retired from the Court, he ex-
pressed regret about his vote in Bowers and believed that the opinion was inconsistent with
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (recognizing that the constitution guarantees cer-
tain zones of personal privacy). See Anand Agneshwar, Powell on Sodomy: Ex-Justice
Says He May Have Been Wrong, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 3, 3 (quoting Justice Powell
as acknowledging, "My vote was the deciding vote that made the decision 5-4," and as
stating, "I think I probably made a mistake in that one," because "I do think it was incon-
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Although it arose under the Due Process Clause, Bowers v.
Hardwick has served as a significant barrier to recognizing classifica-
tions based on homosexuality as suspect under the Equal Protection
Clause.'58 Prior to Bowers, only a few United States Courts of Ap-
peals had examined whether gays constituted a suspect or quasi-
suspect class,159 and all declined to recognize homosexuals as com-
prising such a class.6 ' Bowers has only solidified these conclusions-
since Bowers was decided, "every circuit court which has addressed
the issue has decreed that homosexuals are entitled to no special
constitutional protection, as either a suspect or a quasi-suspect class,
because the conduct which places them in that class is not constitu-
tionally protected."' 6' All of these courts relied on Bowers.6'
sistent in a general way with Roe.... When I had the opportunity to reread the opinions a
few months later, I thought the dissent had the better of the arguments"). Professor Lau-
rence Tribe, who represented Hardwick before the Supreme Court, has speculated that
Justice Powell's retrospective regret about his vote in Bowers casts doubt on the integrity
of the Bowers holding. See Ruth Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Law, WASH.
POST, Oct. 26, 1990, at A3 (quoting Professor Tribe as saying, "The fact that a respected
jurist who is indispensable to the majority conceded that on sober second thought he was
probably wrong certainly will affect the way that future generations look at the decision.").
158. Some legal scholars and judges have criticized this result, asserting that Bowers
was decided upon substantive due process grounds and therefore should not bear on equal
protection analysis. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir.
1989) (Norris, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Hardwick does not foreclose Watkins'
claim because Hardwick was a due process, not an equal protection case."); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due
Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988) (theorizing that the Due
Process Clause protects traditions whereas the Equal Protection Clause protects against
traditions). But see, e.g., Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1427 (9th Cir. 1997)
("[S]ubstantive due process and equal protection doctrine are 'intertwined for purposes of
equal protection analyses of federal action .....'" (quoting High Tech Gays v. Defense
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 n.9 (9th Cir. 1990))).
159. Search of Westlaw, CTA and CTA-OLD databases (Feb. 9, 1997) (search for
cases containing "GAY," "HOMOSEX!," "LESBI," or "BISEX!" in the same paragraph
as "SUSPECT" or "QUASI").
160. See Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Baker has not cited any
cases holding, and we refuse to hold, that homosexuals constitute a suspect or quasi-
suspect classification."); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir.
1984) ("A classification based on one's choice of sexual partners is not suspect."); National
Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 1984) ("We cannot find
that a classification based on the choice of sexual partners is suspect."); DeSantis v. Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979) ("The courts have not designated homo-
sexuals a 'suspect' or 'quasi-suspect' classification so as to require more exacting scrutiny
of classification involving homosexuals.").
161. Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261,266 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116
S. Ct. 2519 (1996); see also id. at 266 n.2 (collecting cases). But see Nabozny v. Podlesney,
92 F.3d 446, 458 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Bowers will soon be eclipsed in the area of equal protec-
tion by the Supreme Court's holding in Romer v. Evans."). The Supreme Court vacated
the lower court's judgment in Equality Foundation and ordered the case remanded "for
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further consideration in light of Romer v. Evans," but the Court left untouched the Sixth
Circuit's determination that homosexuals are not a quasi-suspect class because Romer did
not reach that question. See Equality Found., 116 S. Ct. at 2519; see also Romer, 116 S. Ct.
at 1627 (stating succinctly that Amendment 2 "fail[ed], indeed defie[d]" rational relation
scrutiny); infra notes 205-13 and accompanying text (noting the Court's failure to discuss
whether homosexuals warrant suspect class status or whether Amendment 2 impinged
upon a fundamental right).
162. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was the
first federal circuit to rely on Bowers in refusing to grant suspect class status to homosexu-
als, stating that "[iut would be quite anomalous, on its face, to declare status defined by
conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict scrutiny under
the equal protection clause." Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The
Padula court further stated:
If the [Bowers] Court was unwilling to object to state laws that criminalize the
behavior that defines the class, it is hardly open to a lower court to conclude that
state sponsored discrimination against the class is invidious. After all, there can
hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct
that defines the class criminal.
Id.
All other circuit courts deciding the issue have applied Bowers in a similar fashion.
See, e.g., Equality Found., 54 F.3d at 268 ("Bowers v. Hardwick and its progeny command
that, as a matter of law, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals cannot constitute either a 'suspect
class' or a 'quasi-suspect class.' "). In High Tech Gays v. Defense Industry Security Clear-
ance Office, the Ninth Circuit stated:
[A]Ithough the Court in Hardwick analyzed the constitutionality of the sodomy
statute on a due process rather than equal protection basis, by the Hardwick ma-
jority holding that the Constitution confers no fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy, and because homosexual conduct can thus be
criminalized, homosexuals cannot constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class enti-
tled to greater than rational basis review for equal protection purposes.
High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571; accord Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-65 (7th
Cir. 1989) (holding that the lower court erred in finding homosexuals to be a suspect class
because "homosexual conduct may be constitutionally criminalized" and "an unjustified
and indefensible inconsistency [would otherwise] result"); Woodward v. United States, 871
F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that dis-
crimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.").
Additionally, three military cases did not directly cite Bowers, but relied on precedent
which had relied on Bowers. In Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1996), in-
volving the discharge of a United States Air Force member under the military's "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy, the court refused to grant suspect classification to homosexuals,
relying on Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 920 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 358
(1996). Thomasson involved the honorable discharge of a Naval officer, pursuant to the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, after the officer announced that he was gay. See Thomas-
son, 80 F.3d at 920. Rejecting the officer's arguments urging suspect classification for
homosexuals, the Fourth Circuit declared that a "class comprised of service members who
engage in or have a propensity or intent to engage in such acts is not inherently suspect."
Id. at 928 (citing Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc)). Steffan,
in turn, relied on Padula, 822 F.2d at 103-04, for the proposition that a group defined by
conduct that may be criminalized is not a suspect class. See Steffan, 41 F.3d at 685 n.3. As
stated at the beginning of this footnote, Padula was the first circuit court case to rely on
Bowers. See Padula, 822 F.2d at 103. Thus, all of these cases ultimately rely on Bowers.
For a brief time, the Ninth Circuit considered homosexuals to be a suspect class, but
the decision was withdrawn in a rehearing en banc. See Watkins v. United States Army,
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In addition to simply citing Bowers, several of these courts have
stated that homosexuality is behavioral and hence does not meet the
"immutability" requirement of suspect or quasi-suspect classes.163
Some courts have also stated that homosexuals do not meet the
"politically powerless" requirement for suspect classification.'"
Without the benefit of heightened scrutiny, homosexual litigants of-
ten lose their equal protection claims.65
847 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc). In
the rehearing, the Ninth Circuit never reached the issue of whether classifications based on
homosexuality are suspect because it relied on an estoppel theory. See Watkins, 875 F.2d
at 704-05. The Ninth Circuit has since found that homosexuals do not constitute a suspect
class. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571. For a discussion of the requirements of a sus-
pect or quasi-suspect class, see supra notes 34-36, 48-50 and accompanying text. For an
argument that the military's policy of excluding gays would survive even strict scrutiny, see
David M. Bessho, Note, The Military Ban on Homosexuals: Suspect, Constitutional, or
Both?, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 845 (1996).
163. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573-74 ("Homosexuality is not an immutable
characteristic; it is behavioral and hence is fundamentally different from traits such as
race, gender, or alienage, which define already existing suspect and quasi-suspect classes.
The behavior or conduct of such already recognized classes is irrelevant to their identifica-
tion.") (citation omitted). The Federal Circuit accepted a nearly identical rationale in
Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076:
Homosexuality, as a definitive trait, differs fundamentally from those defining
any of the recognized suspect or quasi-suspect classes. Members of recognized
suspect or quasi-suspect classes, e.g. blacks or women, exhibit immutable charac-
teristics, whereas homosexuality is primarily behavioral in nature. The conduct
or behavior of the members of a recognized suspect or quasi-suspect class has no
relevance to the identification of those groups.
Id. (citations omitted).
Whether homosexuality is immutable has never been scientifically or definitively
demonstrated. See Alafair S.R. Burke, A Few Straight Men: Homosexuals in the Military
and Equal Protection, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 109, 112 (1994) (citing Simon LeVay, A
Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253
ScI. 1034, 1035 (1991)). However, as one federal district court has observed, the Supreme
Court itself does not always list immutability as a necessary characteristic of a suspect
class. See Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 n.5 (D. Kan. 1991) ("In listing the factors
relevant to the determination that a governmental classification is suspect, the Supreme
Court has omitted citing immutability as a requirement on several occasions." (citing City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985); Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973))), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992).
164. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574 (stating that gays are not without political
power because they have achieved anti-discrimination legislation in their favor); Ben-
Shalom, 881 F.2d at 466 & n.9 (citing the existence of an avowed gay congressman, gay top
officials, and support for gays by non-gays).
165. See Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 261 (holding that the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy
withstood rational basis review because of judicial deference to the military); Thomasson,
80 F.3d at 928-29 (holding that the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy was rationally related to
the legitimate military purposes of morale, good order, discipline, and unit cohesion); Stef-
fan, 41 F.3d at 689 & n.10 (upholding, under rational basis review, a naval academy
regulation requiring dismissal of homosexuals on the grounds that a statement of one's
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Thus, when the Supreme Court decided Romer, there were no
disagreements among the federal courts of appeals as to whether
homosexuals constituted a suspect or quasi-suspect class, and the
courts consistently had held that legislation which classified based on
homosexuality withstood rational relation review.'6 However, in
Romer, the Court granted certiorari" to a novel judgment by the
Colorado Supreme Court below-that homosexuals have a funda-
mental right to equal participation in the political process' 8 and that,
under strict scrutiny, Amendment 2 violated this fundamental
homosexuality serves as a rational proxy for homosexual conduct); High Tech Gays, 895
F.2d at 575-76 (holding that the Department of Defense's policy of more expansive back-
ground checks into homosexual applicants for top secret security clearances was rationally
related to the legitimate government interest of protecting classified material, because
counterintelligence efforts particularly targeted gays); Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 465
(holding that an army regulation barring a reserve sergeant from reenlistment due to her
homosexuality was rationally related to the legitimate government interest of military
discipline); Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1070 (holding that the Navy's policy of dismissing those
who engage in homosexual conduct was rationally related to the legitimate state interests
of recruiting and retaining naval service members, preventing breaches of security, and
maintaining discipline, order, morale, and mutual trust); Padula, 822 F.2d at 104 (holding
that the FBI's consideration of homosexual conduct when hiring rationally furthered the
legitimate interests of its law enforcement credibility and of national security); Baker, 769
F.2d at 292 (holding that a Texas anti-sodomy statute was rationally related to the legiti-
mate state interest of implementing morality); Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397-
98 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that the Navy's discharge policy for homosexuals rationally
furthered the legitimate interests of implementing morality as well as maintaining morale
and discipline within the armed forces); Rich, 735 F.2d at 1229 (holding that army regula-
tions which resulted in the discharge of a serviceman for misrepresenting his
homosexuality in the enlistment process rationally furthered the compelling state interest
of maintaining morale and discipline within the armed forces). But see Pruitt v. Cheney,
963 F.2d 1160, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 1991) (refusing, under an "active" rational basis review,
to uphold the dismissal of an equal protection complaint against the Army when there was
nothing in the record to support a rational basis for the Army's regulation requiring dis-
missal of admitted homosexuals).
Legal scholars have directed much attention to the issue of gays in the military. See,
e.g., Diane H. Mazur, The Unknown Soldier: A Critique of 'Gays in the Military' Scholar-
ship and Litigation, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 223, 261-80 (1996) (arguing that scholarship
and litigation regarding gays in the military should focus on the personal stories behind
controversies rather than legal claims or distinctions); Kelly E. Henriksen, Comment,
Gays, the Military, and Judicial Deference: When the Courts Must Reclaim Equal Protec-
tion as TheirArea of Expertise, 9 ADMIN. L.. AM. U. 1273, 1280-85 (examining the role of
judicial deference in equal protection analysis of military policies); Alicia Christina Al-
meida, Note, Thomasson v. Perry: Has the Fourth Circuit Taken "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
Too Literally?, 75 N.C. L. REV. 967, 1025 (1997) (predicting that courts will continue to
uphold the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy "until the homophobic concerns of the armed
forces are put to rest."); Bessho, supra note 162, at 871 (suggesting that the military ban on
homosexuality would even survive strict scrutiny).
166. See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text (collecting cases).
167. Romer v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995).
168. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1286 (Colo. 1993).
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right.6 9 After the Court granted certiorari to Romer, however, the
Sixth Circuit determined in Equality Foundation v. City of Cincin-
nati7 0 that there is no such fundamental right to participate equally in
the political process."'
Equality Foundation involved an amendment to the city charter
of Cincinnati, Ohio which sought, like Amendment 2, to disallow
protections for homosexuals."' The amendment, known as Issue 3,
was passed in response to two Cincinnati city ordinances: one pro-
hibited the city from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation
(among other classifications) in its hiring practices, and the other
prohibited private discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
(among other bases) in employment, housing, and public accommo-
dation. 3 Issue 3 passed by a vote of 62% to 38% and was
challenged in United States District Court on equal protection
grounds, among others.74
The district court found that Issue 3 was subject to heightened
scrutiny because gays both had a fundamental right to equal partici-
pation in the political process and were a quasi-suspect class.' The
169. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1350 (Colo. 1994), aff'd on other grounds, 116
S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
170. 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996).
171. See id. at 269. Given the conflict between the Romer and Equality Foundation
decisions below, it appeared that the Court would decide whether there is a fundamental
right to participate equally in the political process; however, the Court ultimately left this
issue unresolved. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624 ("We granted certiorari and now affirm
the judgment, but on a rationale different from that adopted by the State Supreme
Court."); infra note 178 (discussing this point further).
172. See Equality Found., 54 F.3d at 263-64. The amendment stated:
ARTICLE XII
No Special Class Status May Be Granted Based Upon Sexual Orientation, Conduct
Or Relationships.
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not en-
act, adopt, enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which
provides that homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or re-
lationship constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a person with the basis to
have any claim of minority or protected status, quota preference or other prefer-
ential treatment. This provision of the City Charter shall in all respects be self-
executing. Any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy enacted before this amend-
ment is adopted that violates the foregoing prohibition shall be null and void and
of no force or effect.
Id. at 264 (quoting CINCINNATI, OHIO, CHARTER art. XII (Nov. 2, 1993)).
173. See id. at 263.
174. See id. at 264.
175. See Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 429, 436 (S.D. Ohio
1994), affid in part and vacated in part, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519
(1996).
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court also held that Issue 3 was not rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. 17' The Sixth Circuit reversed the trial court, finding
that gays were not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, that there was no
fundamental right to equal participation in the political process, and
that Issue 3 furthered the legitimate state interests of promoting
freedom of association and ensuring that the municipality remained
neutral on the issue of homosexuality.Y
7
Equality Foundation and Romer set the stage for the Supreme
Court to resolve whether there is a fundamental right to equal par-
ticipation in the political process. 78 The Romer Court, however,
sidestepped this issue as it subtly broke new ground in equal protec-
tion jurisprudence. 79  The resulting decision exhibits some
deficiencies and leaves a number of questions unanswered. First,
because the Court divided over the precise meaning and effect of
Amendment 2, the decision may rest upon an invalid and inaccurate
premise.18 Second, the Court did not take the opportunity to an-
nounce whether classifications based on homosexuality deserve
heightened scrutiny! 8 Third, although the majority purported to
employ rational relation review, it appeared to apply a higher stan-
176. See id. at 441.
177. See Equality Found., 54 F.3d at 268-70.
178. The Court granted certiorari to Romer prior to the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Equality Foundation. Compare Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (1994), cert. granted, 115 S.
Ct. 1092 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1995) (No. 94-1039), with Equality Found., 54 F.3d at 261 (decision
filed May 12, 1995). However, the Supreme Court Rules of Practice specifically contem-
plate that the Court should resolve splits between federal courts of appeals and state
courts of last resort. See SUP. Cr. R. 10(b) (providing that if "a state court of last resort
has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with the decision. .. of a
United States court of appeals," it may be a compelling reason to grant certiorari). The
Court commonly grants certiorari to resolve conflicts among the federal courts of appeals,
as well. See SUP. Cr. R. 10(a) (contemplating as a compelling reason to grant certiorari
the fact that "a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the
decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter"); see
also, e.g., Beaulieu v. United States, 497 U.S. 1038, 1039 (1990), denying cert. to 893 F.2d
1177 (10th Cir. 1990) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should grant certiorari
to "conflicts among Courts of Appeals ... if the federal law is to be maintained in any
satisfactory, uniform condition"). By resolving conflicting decisions, the Supreme Court
prevents "federal law ... [from] being administered in different ways in different parts of
the country" and protects "citizens in some circuits [from being] subject to liabilities or
entitlements that citizens in other circuits are not burdened with or entitled to." Id.
(White, J., dissenting). These purposes would have been furthered in Romer had the Court
resolved the split between the Colorado Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit, despite the
fact that the conflict arose after the Court granted certiorari in Romer.
179. See infra notes 205-09, 265-76 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 184-204 and accompanying text.
181. See infra notes 205-13 and accompanying text.
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dard, and in addition it failed to distinguish Bowers v. Hardwick.'8
Finally, the Court appears to have introduced a "per se" constitu-
tional analysis for equal protection claims, the ultimate implications
of which are unclear.18'3 Each of these issues will be discussed in turn.
The divisive issue over which the Justices clashed concerned the
proper meaning and effect of Amendment 2.184 The majority and dis-
sent disagreed over whether Amendment 2 would merely deny
"special rights" to homosexuals, and it is likely that the case turned
on this characterization.85 This conflict identifies the possibility that
Romer rests upon an invalid premise. That is, if-as the majority
held-Amendment 2 created an impermissible barrier to homosexu-
als seeking ordinary protection under the law, it violated the Equal
Protection Clause.8 ' However, if-as the dissent argued-the
Amendment only barred homosexuals from seeking preferential
treatment under the law, then it did not constitute a violation of
equal protection.'8 7
Each side rested its argument on the "authoritative construction
of Colorado's Supreme Court."'" Drawing on the Colorado court's
language regarding the immediate and ultimate effects of Amend-
ment 2, '89 the majority concluded that the Amendment "withdraws
from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the
injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of
these laws and policies."'9 The majority's view, a broad interpreta-
182. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see infra notes 214-64 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 265-91 and accompanying text.
184. Compare Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624 ("[T]he State says, the measure does no more
than deny homosexuals special rights. This reading of the amendment's language is im-
plausible."), with id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The amendment prohibits special
treatment of homosexuals, and nothing more.").
185. See id. at 1629 ("We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not
to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colo-
rado cannot do .... Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause.").
186. See id.
187. See id. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[As] to whether there was a legitimate
rational basis for ... the prohibition of special protection for homosexuals.... the answer
is so obviously yes." (footnote omitted)).
188. See id. at 1624 ("We rely not upon our own interpretation of the amendment but
upon the authoritative construction of Colorado's Supreme Court."); id. at 1630 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that Colorado's Supreme Court "authoritatively declare[d]" and
"has resolved ... for us" that Amendment 2 would not affect general anti-discrimination
laws).
189. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1284-85 (Colo. 1993).
190. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1625 (emphasis added). The withdrawn protections guard
against discrimination in private transactions in housing, real estate, insurance, health,
welfare, private education, and employment, as well as discrimination by every level of the
1997] 1921
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tion of Amendment 2, can be restated as follows: Amendment 2
withdrew more than special protections from homosexuals because it
(1) removed existing specific protections against discrimination, and
(2) removed the opportunity, outside of a state constitutional
amendment, for homosexuals to seek specific protections in the fu-
ture via the political process.'
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, declared that "[t]he amend-
ment prohibits special treatment of homosexuals, and nothing
more."'192 He borrowed language from the Colorado Supreme Court
which supported his view that laws which prohibit arbitrary discrimi-
nation "would continue to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
homosexual conduct as well."'93 Justice Scalia's view, a narrow inter-
pretation of Amendment 2, can be restated as follows: Amendment
2 merely withdrew special protections from homosexuals because (1)
existing laws prohibiting arbitrary discrimination provided current
protection for homosexuals, and (2) the need for homosexuals to
seek specific protections in the future via the political process is un-
necessary because they have the protection of existing laws.'94
Thus, adherence to a broad or narrow interpretation of
Amendment 2 greatly influenced each side's argument. Yet the ma-
jority proclaimed that its reasoning would remain sound even under
Justice Scalia's narrow interpretation:
[E]ven if, as we doubt, homosexuals could find some safe
harbor in laws of general application, we cannot accept the
view that Amendment 2's prohibition on specific legal pro-
tections does no more than deprive homosexuals of special
rights. To the contrary, the amendment imposes a special
state government. See id. at 1626.
191. See id. at 1627.
192. Id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The language of the Colorado Supreme Court was as
follows:
Colorado law currently proscribes discrimination against persons who are not
suspect classes, including discrimination based on age, marital or family status,
veterans' status, and for any legal, off-duty conduct such as smoking tobacco. Of
course Amendment 2 is not intended to have any effect on this legislation, but
seeks only to prevent the adoption of anti-discrimination laws intended to protect
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (citations omitted) (quoting Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1346 n.9 (1994)). The
majority, however, suggested that this statement was not definitive, asserting that it was a
"limited observation" made "[i]n the course of rejecting the argument that Amendment 2
is intended to conserve resources to fight discrimination against suspect classes." Id. at
1626.
194. See id. at 1630-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 751922
COLORADO AMENDMENT 2
disability upon those persons alone. Homosexuals are for-
bidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek
without constraint. They can obtain specific protection
against discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of
Colorado to amend the state constitution or perhaps, on the
State's view, by trying to pass helpful laws of general appli-
cability."S
However, the majority failed to demonstrate exactly why Justice
Scalia's argument "that 'general laws and policies that prohibit arbi-
trary discrimination' would continue to" protect homosexuals under
Amendment 2196 was inconsequential. Rather, the majority simply
restated the same conclusions it had arrived at prior to considering
the dissent's argument 97 and stated Amendment 2 nevertheless with-
draws from homosexuals "protections taken for granted by most
people either because they already have them or do not need
them. 198
Additionally, the majority's declaration that its analysis re-
mained the same even if general antidiscrimination laws would
continue to protect homosexuals under Amendment 2 opened the
door to the bulk of Justice Scalia's dissent-if the majority had not
made this assertion, then Justice Scalia never could have advanced
his claim that "the principle underlying the Court's opinion is that
one who is accorded equal treatment under the laws, but cannot as
readily as others obtain preferential treatment under the laws, has
been denied equal protection of the laws," nor could he have so eas-
ily characterized the Court's opinion as "terminal silliness."' 99
Moreover, because Justice Scalia premised the greater portion of his
dissent on the idea that laws of general application would continue to
protect homosexuals under Amendment 2's regime,200 if the Court
195. Id. at 1626-27 (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id at 1626).
197. See id. at 1625 (stating the majority's original conclusion, based upon the immedi-
ate and ultimate effects of Amendment 2, that "[t]he amendment withdraws from
homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimi-
nation, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies"). The Court's final
conclusion also is somewhat internally inconsistent, because it begins with the proposition
that "homosexuals could find some safe harbor in laws of general application," and it then
contradicts that premise by stating that "perhaps [homosexuals could obtain protection
against discrimination] by trying to pass helpful laws of general applicability." See id. at
1626-27 (emphasis added).
198. Id. at 1627.
199. Id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
200. See id. at 1629-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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had not granted him this premise, then his whole "special rights" ar-
gument would have fallen.
The Romer decision would have been stronger had the Court
maintained its position that Amendment 2 would preclude homo-
sexuals from protection under antidiscrimination laws of general
applicability."' Though Justice Scalia still could have argued that
such an interpretation was inconsistent with language from the Colo-
rado Supreme Court's opinion,2° the majority already dismissed this
language as nothing more than a "limited observation. " 20 ' In addi-
tion, the majority had already set forth a highly persuasive argument
that laws prohibiting arbitrary discrimination would not protect ho-
mosexuals:
At some point in the systematic administration of these
laws, an official must determine whether homosexuality is
an arbitrary and thus forbidden basis for decision. Yet a
decision to that effect would itself amount to a policy pro-
hibiting discrimination on the basis of homosexuality, and
so would appear to be no more valid under Amendment 2
than the specific prohibitions against discrimination the
state court held invalid.l 4
The majority had no need to concede that the laws of general appli-
cation might continue to protect homosexuals under Amendment 2.
By trying to have it both ways, the majority's opinion left inconsis-
tencies to be attacked and capitalized upon by the dissent.
A second ambiguity in the Romer decision is the Court's failure
to pinpoint the applicable level of scrutiny for classifications based
on homosexuality. 5 The Court did not state whether homosexuals
constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class, nor did it state whether
Amendment 2 impinged upon a fundamental right. 6 Rather, in ref-
201. See id. at 1626 ("It is a fair, if not necessary, inference from the broad language of
the amendment that it deprives gays and lesbians even of the protection of general laws
and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental and private settings.").
202. See id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting); supra note 193 (quoting the Colorado Su-
preme Court's opinion).
203. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626.
204. Id.
205. Even though the federal circuits appear to be aligned on this issue, see supra notes
161-62 and accompanying text, there is still some confusion. For example, the Ninth Cir-
cuit at one time held that classifications based on homosexuality were suspect, but that
decision was withdrawn in a rehearing en banc. See Watkins v. United States Army, 847
F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); see also
supra note 162 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's brief recognition of homosexuals as a sus-
pect class).
206. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627 (proceeding to a rational basis analysis without con-
1924 [Vol. 75
1997] COLORADO AMENDMENT2 1925
erence to rational relation review, the Court simply stated that
"Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry."
20
This ambiguity makes it possible for the Court to hold at a later date,
without contradicting Romer, that homosexual classifications warrant
heightened scrutiny because they are suspect or quasi-suspect.208 The
sidering these issues).
207. Id. (emphasis added).
208. Although lower courts have refused to declare that homosexuals constitute a sus-
pect or quasi-suspect class, see supra note 162 (gathering cases), judges and scholars have
made numerous arguments for doing so, see, e.g., Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860
F. Supp. 417, 434-40 (S.D. Ohio 1994), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 54 F.3d 261 (6th
Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996); Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1345-49; High Tech Gays
v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1368-70 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd
in part and vacated in part, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990); Renee Culverhouse & Christine
Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect Class, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 205 (1993); David A.J. Rich-
ards, Sexual Preference as a Suspect (Religious) Classification: An Alternative Perspective
on the Unconstitutionality of Anti-Lesbian/Gay Initiatives, 55 OHIo ST. L.J. 491 (1994);
Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753 (1996); Marion Halliday Lewis, Note, Unacceptable Risk or Un-
acceptable Rhetoric? An Argument for a Quasi-Suspect Classification for Gays Based on
Current Government Security Clearance Procedures, 7 J.L. & POL. 133 (1990); Harris M.
Miller II, Note, An Argument For the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny
to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797 (1984); Note, The Con-
stitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985).
Judge Spiegel's opinion in Equality Foundation illustrates the general tenor of these
arguments. He outlined five requirements for a quasi-suspect class, as extracted from
various cases. See Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 436; see also supra notes 34-36, 48-50
and accompanying text (discussing the characteristics of suspect and quasi-suspect classes).
Applying these requirements to homosexuals, the court declared that homosexuals consti-
tute a quasi-suspect class. See Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 436.
First, the court found that homosexuals had suffered a history of discrimination in the
form of stereotypical notions that homosexuals exhibit effeminate characteristics, suffer
from mental illness, and engage in deviant sexual behavior. See id. at 436-37. As a result
of these stereotypes, homosexuals have suffered private and public discrimination in the
form of blacklisting, arrest, and censorship. See id. Second, the court found that sexual
orientation is not indicative of a person's abilities. See id. at 437. If homosexuals' abilities
were impaired, the court reasoned, then they would be unable to remain "in the Closet."
See id. Third and fourth, the court determined that homosexuality was immutable and
beyond the individual's control, that a person's sexual orientation is fixed by the time he is
three to five years old, and that homosexuality is a personal characteristic as opposed to a
type of volitional conduct. See id. Thus, the court distinguished homosexuality from con-
duct that is under the individual's control, and accepted as true evidence showing that
homosexuality is "unamenable to techniques designed to change it." Id. Fifth, the court
determined that homosexuals, although not wholly politically powerless, faced impedi-
ments to such power. See id. Such impediments included the reluctance of other groups to
form coalitions with homosexuals, the success of 34 of 38 ballot initiatives nationwide
which sought to limit protections for gays, and a lack of homosexuals in "the 'Nation's
decisionmaking councils' as were women at the time of the Frontiero decision." Id. at 438-
39 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973)). Finally, the court
distinguished cases holding that homosexuals did not constitute a suspect class on the basis
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ambiguity also allows the Colorado Supreme Court's finding that
homosexuals have a fundamental right to equal participation in the
political process to remain a potential argument for strict scrutiny in
the future.0 9
The Court could have clarified these issues once and for all,
preventing any future "disarray, 2'0 among the lower courts; instead,
it apparently adhered to the "wisdom of allowing difficult issues to
mature through full consideration by the courts of appeals. 2 . How-
ever, the Sixth Circuit and the Colorado Supreme Court came to
different conclusions on whether there is a fundamental right to
equal participation in the political process,2 12 and the Court arguably
should have resolved this split.2"3
The third ambiguity in the Romer decision is that, although the
Court purported to apply rational relation review, in actuality, its
review appears to have been much stricter. The rational basis test
involves two steps: (1) determining whether a "legitimate" state
purpose is involved, and (2) determining whether the classification
bears a rational relationship to that legitimate purpose.2 4 The ma-
that those cases defined homosexuality by conduct, as opposed to a trait existing inde-
pendently of conduct. See id. at 439-40.
209. Although the Colorado Supreme Court initially enjoined enforcement of Amend-
ment 2 because it held the Amendment violated a fundamental right to equal participation
in the political process, see Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1286 (Colo. 1993), the United
States Supreme Court invalidated the Amendment "on a rationale different from that
adopted by the State Supreme Court." Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624. Justice Scalia, dissent-
ing, interpreted the Romer majority's opinion to mean that the Court rejected the notion
that equal participation in the political process is a fundamental right. See id. at 1636 n.3
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court rejects the Colorado court's view that there exists a
fundamental right to participate in the political process."). However, because the Court
did not squarely address the question, recognition in the future of such a fundamental right
remains an open possibility. For a description of the Colorado Supreme Court's finding of
this fundamental right, see supra note 64 and accompanying text,
210. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1016 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with Court's denial of certiorari to 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984));
see also supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text (discussing Rowland).
211. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135 n.26 (1977).
212. Compare Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261,268-70 (6th Cir. 1995)
(holding that homosexuals do not constitute a suspect class, that there is no fundamental
right to equal participation in the political process, and that Cincinnati Issue 3 was ration-
ally related to legitimate state interests), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996), with Evans v.
Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1350 (Colo. 1994) (upholding permanent injunction against
Amendment 2 under strict scrutiny on the basis that the Amendment violated homosexu-
als' fundamental right to equal participation in the political process), affd on other
grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
213. See supra notes 171, 178 and accompanying text (noting that Romer presented the
Court with a compelling and appropriate vehicle to resolve the conflicting judgments).
214. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,440 (1985).
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jority gave cursory treatment to the first step, considering only two of
the interests offered by the appellants: "The primary rationale the
State offers for Amendment 2 is respect for other citizens' freedom
of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employ-
ers who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality.
Colorado also cites its interest in conserving resources to fight dis-
crimination against other groups."21
The Court then moved to step two of the analysis, concluding
that "[t]he breadth of the Amendment is so far removed from these
particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them. 216
Furthermore, the Court stated that "Amendment 2 is [not] directed
to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective., 217 This
conclusion, however, seems deficient in that the Court completely
ignored the other interests offered by the appellants. 8 Perhaps the
most blatant omission was the Court's failure to consider the state's
interest in preserving morality, which the Colorado Supreme Court
found at the very least to be legitimate 9 and which Justice Scalia ar-
gued provided a rational basis for Amendment 2"
The Supreme Court has previously stated that rational relation
review under
equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wis-
dom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of
social and economic policy, a statutory classification ...
215. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
216. Id. (emphasis added).
217. Id. (emphasis added).
218. In addition to the two interests mentioned by the Court, Colorado submitted sev-
eral others. The Court did not focus on four other interests which Colorado had asserted
at trial. The Colorado Supreme Court listed them as follows: "(1) deterring factionalism;
(2) preserving the integrity of the state's political functions; ... (5) preventing government
from subsidizing the political objectives of a special interest group; and (6) promoting the
physical and psychological well-being of Colorado children." Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d
1335, 1339-40 (Colo. 1994), aff'd on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). The state did
not reassert the sixth interest on appeal, however. See id. at 1340 n.2.
219. See id. at 1346 n.11. The court stated that morality is at most a substantial gov-
ernment interest but not a compelling one. See id. at 1347. It also expressed that
"Amendment 2 is not necessary to preserve heterosexual families, marriage, or to express
disapproval of gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals." Id. Therefore, the state's interest in
morality was not enough to allow Amendment 2 to survive the state court's strict scrutiny.
See id. However, because the United States Supreme Court utilized the lower rational
basis standard, it could have considered Amendment 2 as rationally related to the state's
interest in preserving morality, and such a determination would have been entirely consis-
tent with the state court's ruling. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (noting that rational basis
review only requires a rational relationship to a legitimate state end).
220. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there
is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could pro-
vide a rational basis for the classification."1
A reasonably conceivable state of facts, advanced by the defendants
in their argument to the Colorado Supreme Court, was that
Amendment 2 implicitly discouraged conduct of which the people of
Colorado morally disapprove.222 As Justice Scalia argued in the dis-
sent, the impetus for Amendment 2 was not animosity towards
homosexuals, but animosity towards "homosexual conduct, the same
sort of moral disapproval that produced the centuries-old criminal
laws that we held constitutional in Bowers.
'
,
223
The Court's failure to examine the morality argument ties into
its failure to mention Bowers v. Hardwick.224 This omission was con-
spicuous because Bowers appears to support a rational basis for the
Amendment.22' Although Bowers was a due process case, the circuit
courts have consistently applied it in the equal protection context.
226
Thus, Justice Scalia argued that if morality provided a rational basis
for sodomy laws in Bowers, then it should serve as a rational basis
for Amendment 2.27
If the Court had delved into the morality issue, it would have
faced more than Bowers. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,2"8 within
the context of First Amendment freedom of expression, a plurality of
the Court upheld a public indecency statute in part because it fur-
thered "a substantial government interest in protecting order and
morality."2 9 In fact, it is difficult to conceive of any law not based
221. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,313 (1993) (emphasis added).
222. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1347 (Colo. 1994), affd on other grounds, 116
S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
223. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also Baker
v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that a Texas sodomy statute did not
violate equal protection because it was rationally related to legitimate state interest in
morality).
224. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
225. The Bowers Court upheld Georgia's sodomy statute under a due process chal-
lenge, finding that the "belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable" is an "Iadequate rationale to support the law." Id.
at 196.
226. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text (collecting cases and discussing the
application of Bowers in equal protection jurisprudence).
227. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
229. Id. at 569. Four Justices held that morality was a substantial state interest, but the
fifth vote came from Justice Souter, who did not rely on the morality argument. See id. at
582 (Souter, J., concurring).
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ultimately upon the collective moral judgments of society."
In light of its previous holdings that morality is an acceptable
basis for government action, it is surprising that the Court did not
mention this interest, even if only to assert that Amendment 2 is not
an "appropriate way[] of advancing even valid moral beliefs. 23 1 The
230. See Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Dronenberg, the court
stated that "[i]t is to be doubted that very many laws exist whose ultimate justification
does not rest upon the society's morality." Id. at 1397. To exemplify this assertion, the
court pointed to an instance during oral arguments when the appellant argued that naval
regulations and other government action could not be founded upon moral abhorrence.
See id. at 1397 n.6. When asked by the court about laws against bestiality, the appellant
cited cruelty to animals as an appropriate basis for their prohibition. See id. The D.C.
Circuit noted that "[t]he objection to cruelty to animals is, of course, an objection on
grounds of morality." Id
231. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1347 (Colo. 1994), affd on other grounds, 116 S.
Ct. 1620 (1996). Legal commentators have asserted that the courts are an inappropriate
forum for regulating morality. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Six Conservatives in Search of the
First Amendment: The Revealing Case of Nude Dancing, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 611,
619 n.45 (1992) (gathering numerous sources regarding the role of the judiciary in enforc-
ing morality); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WiS.
L. REV. 187, 230 ("Wooden reliance upon traditional moral values is particularly inappro-
priate when it comes to state policies governing family life and sexuality because social
conceptions of these subjects are so deeply shaped by gender stereotypes."); Andrew P.
Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful Discharge
Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901, 1916 n.48 (1996) ("I think Bowers provides a convincing ar-
gument why... [the law playing a moral role] is inappropriate.").
However, many judges would argue that decisions like Bowers actually keep the judi-
ciary uninvolved in moral matters, reserving them for the people and the legislatures. See,
e.g., Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I think it no business of the courts
(as opposed to the political branches) to take sides in this culture war."); Miller v. Civil
City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1106 (7th Cir. 1990) (Coffey, J., dissenting) ("I am not
one of those who believes that it is the role of the federal courts, through the creation of a
'living constitution,' to, in effect, establish a secular moral view that contributes to the
piece-by-piece dismantling of our historic Judaeo-Christian principles and heritage."),
rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). Similarly, the Fifth Cir-
cuit, when denying a rehearing of its decision to uphold a Texas sodomy statute on the
basis of morality, declared that "[ilt is not the role or authority of this federal court to
decide the morality of sexual conduct for the people of the state of Texas." Baker v.
Wade, 774 F.2d 1285, 1286-87 (5th Cir.), denying reh'g to 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985).
Thus, the Fifth Circuit distinguished between serving as "arbiter of the rationality of the
moral judgment of the people of Texas" from serving as arbiter of "the actuality of that
moral judgment of the Texas public as a rational basis for the statute." Id. at 1286. Judge
Reavley, writing for the majority, ended Baker v. Wade with this admonition:
Moral issues should be resolved by the people, and the laws pertaining thereto
should be written or rescinded by the representatives of the people. Were a fed-
eral court to decree that the United States Constitution decides the issue and
override the opinion of those of the different view, the natural course of the pub-
lic debate and the developing consensus would be misshapen.... Furthermore,
the courts could be the biggest losers due to the reaction of the members of the
public who regard the court's decision as morally wrong and who see the wisdom
on moral issues as properly, and better, residing in the public forums and repre-
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Court's failure to broach the morality argument may suggest that the
Justices in the Romer majority purposefully avoided Bowers, perhaps
because some members of the Court wish to overturn Bowers but
have yet to reach the necessary consensus.~2
Although the Court only mentioned a few of the interests of-
fered by the state, the Court focused its analysis on the second step
of rational basis review-whether the Amendment rationally fur-
thered any of these interests.~3 Despite the ease with which most
legislative classifications withstand rational relation scrutiny,2 4 the
Court nevertheless held that Amendment 2 was "a status-based en-
actment divorced from any factual context from which we could
discern a relationship to legitimate state interests., 23' The Court
largely focused on the breadth of the Amendment to come to this
sentative assemblies rather than in the federal judiciary.
Id. at 1287 (emphasis added).
232. Recall that Justice Powell, who was the "swing vote" in Bowers, see Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring), expressed regret about the
decision after he retired from the Court, see supra note 157 (providing Justice Powell's
sentiments). Commentators have predicted that a reversal of Bowers may be quite un-
likely. See, e.g., David Helscher, Griswold v. Connecticut and the Unenumerated Right of
Privacy, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 33, 60 (1994) (analyzing the composition of the Court and
predicting how each Justice might vote if the issue in Bowers were revisited).
233. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628-29.
234. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen applied as articulated, [the rational basis test] leaves
little doubt about the outcome; the challenged legislation is always upheld."); Mark
Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On Discriminating, Unwittingly or
Otherwise, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 937, 941 (1991) ("The rational basis test is notoriously
weak.").
In contrast to the leniency of rational relation review, strict scrutiny has been de-
scribed by one influential commentator as "'strict' in theory, but fatal in fact." Gerald
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). In
the years since Professor Gunther coined this phrase, members of the Court have quoted it
numerous times. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Powell, J., con-
curring) (quoting Gunther, supra, at 8); id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978)
(Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Gunther, supra, at 8)). However, a majority of the Court re-
cently disavowed the "'strict' in theory, fatal in fact" characterization of strict scrutiny.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995) ("[W]e wish to dispel
the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'" (quoting Fullilove, 448
U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment))). Adarand was a five-to-four deci-
sion, although Justice Scalia joined only to the extent that the holding was not inconsistent
with his view that there could never be a compelling interest for benign racial classifica-
tions. See id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment),
235. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
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conclusion76 and surmised that animosity was the only impetus for
Amendment 2's passage2 7 These conclusions, however, are not con-
sistent with the deference courts historically accord to ordinary
legislative classifications under rational relation review.238
Thus, the inevitable inference arises that the Court actually ap-
plied an "active" or "second order" rational basis review-
heightened scrutiny in the guise of rational basis review-even
though the Court has never acknowledged that such a standard ex-
ists.f 9 The notion of this "active" standard arose in City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center,240 wherein the Court invalidated, purport-
edly under rational basis review, a city zoning ordinance which
required a special permit for a group home for the mentally re-
tarded.241 Justice Marshall, in a separate opinion, argued that the
Court was applying heightened scrutiny because it looked to the rec-
ord for support and appeared to put the burden on the defendants
rather than the plaintiffs.
242
Romer and Cleburne contain parallels that reinforce the infer-
ence that the Court applied an active rational basis review in Romer.
First, both the Romer and Cleburne Courts cited Department of Agri-
culture v. Moreno243 for the proposition that the classification's only
236. See id. at 1627.
237. See id. at 1628.
238. Rational relation review grants the governmental classification "a strong presump-
tion of validity," Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993), as any reasonably conceivable
state of facts is sufficient to uphold it, see FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 313 (1993). The party challenging the classification bears the burden of negating any
possible basis of its support. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 320-21. Furthermore, "judicial inter-
vention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely [the Court] may think a political
branch has acted." Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979). See also supra notes 52-59
and accompanying text (describing rational basis review).
239. Indeed, the Court has expressly disavowed the existence of a "second order" ra-
tional basis review. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 321; see also supra note 52 (discussing "active"
rational basis review and the Court's repudiation of it).
240. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
241. See id. at 435.
242. See id. at 458-59 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); supra note 52 (discussing the genesis and evolution of active rational basis review).
243. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). In Moreno, an amendment to the Food Stamp Act redefined
"household" to only include related individuals. See id. at 530. The Court held that a con-
gressional desire to prevent "hippies" from participating in the food stamp program was
not a legitimate state purpose because it amounted to nothing more than a desire to harm
a politically unpopular group. See id. at 534. Justice Marshall later criticized the Moreno
Court for engaging in "second order" rational basis review. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 460
n.4 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[Moreno]
must be and generally ha[s] been viewed as [an] intermediate review decision[] masquer-
ading in rational basis language." (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
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purpose was a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular class. 4
Also, both Romer and Cleburne mentioned the imprecise lines drawn
by the classifications. 5
"Active" rational basis review gives rise to two problems: (1) it
creates precedent for applying heightened review to subsequent
cases that only warrant ordinary rational basis review, and (2) "by
failing to articulate the factors that justify... 'second order' rational-
basis review, the Court provides no principled foundation for deter-
mining when more searching inquiry is to be invoked., 246  These
problems likely were the impetus for the Court to declare, in Heller
v. Doe, that Cleburne did not involve anything beyond the traditional
rational basis test.247 However, by resurrecting language used in
Moreno and Cleburne regarding a "bare ... desire to harm a politi-
cally unpopular group, 248 the Romer Court inadvertently may have
loaned more credence to a standard of review that it specifically
disavowed in Heller. Such a result would be unfortunate in light of
the two problems identified above.249
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-31, at 1090 n.10 (1st ed. 1978))).
244. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446-47.
245. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1622, 1625, 1627, 1629 (repeatedly referring to the
"breadth" of the Amendment as problematic); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449 (criticizing the
municipality's imprecise reasons for refusing to issue a zoning permi. to a group home for
mentally retarded as insufficient to justify the refusal).
246. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
247. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1993) (describing the rational relation
test as placing the burden on the classification's challenger to negate every conceivable
basis for the law and stating that Cleburne applied the standard as thus described).
248. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (" '[I]f the constitutional conception of 'equal pro-
tection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare... desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.' "
(quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534)); see also Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447 (quoting the same
language from Moreno). The Court had not quoted this language since Lyng v. UAW, 485
U.S. 360, 370 n.8 (1988). Search of Westlaw, SCT database (Feb. 16, 1997) (search for
cases containing "DESIRE," "HARM," and "UNPOPULAR" in the same sentence).
Interestingly, the Court in Lyng stressed that "[tlhis statement is merely an application of
the usual rational-basis test." Lyng, 485 U.S. at 370 n.8.
249. These problems are somewhat mitigated by the Court limiting this level of review
to classifications involving politically unpopular classes such as hippies, the mentally re-
tarded, or gays. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (homosexuals); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446-47
(mentally retarded); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 (hippies). The problem is determining what
a politically unpopular group might be, a determination about which reasonable minds
certainly can differ. For example, consider Justice Scalia's argument in Romer that homo-
sexuals cannot be considered a politically unpopular group:
It is also nothing short of preposterous to call "politically unpopular" a group
which enjoys enormous influence in American media and politics, and which, as
the trial court here noted, though composing no more than 4% of the population
had the support of 46% of the voters on Amendment 2.
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The Romer Court's analysis clearly departed from the tradi-
tional standard of rational basis review that mandates a "strong
presumption of validity." ' Instead, the Court declared that "laws of
the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disad-
vantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons
affected."'" Thus, the Court characterized its own determination of
animosity as a presumption, in direct contradiction with the require-
ments of its own precedent.2 The Court did try to justify this
presumption by quoting Moreno's" 'bare... desire to harm a politi-
cally unpopular group'" language.' 3 This reliance was misplaced,
however, because in Moreno, the Court relied on legislative history
demonstrating animosity toward "hippies. ' ' 5' The Romer Court,
however, drew upon no similar record demonstrating animosity to-
ward homosexuals. In fact, Colorado voters "repeatedly told
pollsters that they were principally concerned about unwarranted
expansion of group rights and harbor no animus toward individual
homosexuals."' 5
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
250. Heller, 509 U.S. at 319 (emphasis added).
251. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added).
252. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 319 (granting a presumption of validity to classifications
examined under the rational basis test).
253. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
254. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 ("The legislative history ... indicates that that
amendment was intended to prevent socalled [sic] 'hippies' and 'hippie communes' from
participating in the food stamp program." (citing 116 CONG. REC. 44,439 (1970)
(statement of Sen. Holland) (""[T]he term 'household' was further defined so as to exclude
households consisting of unrelated individuals under the age of 60, such as 'hippy' com-
munes, which I think is a good provision in this bill."))). Similarly, the Cleburne Court
relied on evidence of animosity toward the mentally retarded:
The District Court found that the City Council's insistence on the permit
[which would be required in order to operate a home for the mentally retarded in
a particular land zone] rested on several factors. First, the Council was con-
cerned with the negative attitude of the majority of property owners located
within 200 feet of the [home for mentally retarded persons], as well as with the
fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood. But mere negative attitudes, or
fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning pro-
ceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded
differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
255. Al Knight, When Did 800,000 Colorado Voters Become Irrational?, DENV. POST,
June 9, 1996, at D5 (emphasis added). Along this line, Justice Scalia argued in Romer that
"[t]he Court's portrayal of Coloradans as a society fallen victim to pointless, hate-filled
'gay-bashing' is so false as to be comical." Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). He pointed to Colorado being one of the first states to repeal sodomy laws, although
he stressed that such abolition does not necessarily translate into a moral approval of ho-
mosexuality. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The Court's analysis also departed from the traditional standard
of rational basis review prohibiting the invalidation of a law that
simply classifies imprecisely or results in some inequality. 6 Though
the Court repeatedly referred to the breadth of the Amendment as
rendering it too far removed from the state's interests, 7 Justice Mar-
shall's observations in Cleburne are still applicable in the context of
Romer: "I share the Court's criticisms of the overly broad lines that
Cleburne's zoning ordinance has drawn. But if the ordinance is to be
invalidated for its imprecise classifications, it must be pursuant to
more powerful scrutiny than the minimal rational-basis test.... ,,"s
Because the Romer Court did not expressly hold that rational
relation scrutiny is the exclusive level of review for classifications in-
volving homosexuality,29 and because the Court appeared to apply a
stricter than usual rational basis test,261 it may have done exactly what
Justice Marshall suggested in Cleburne-"employ[ed] ... particularly
searching scrutiny," thereby laying the groundwork for granting sus-
pect or quasi-suspect status to classifications based on
homosexuality.26t One legal commentator has observed that Romer
"calls to mind the Court's opinion in Reed v. Reed," which was the
first Supreme Court case to invalidate under the Equal Protection
Clause a classification based on sex.12 Of course, "Reed is now rec-
ognized as the case that ushered in the era of heightened scrutiny for
gender discrimination., 263 This analogy suggests that the Court may
very well determine that homosexuals constitute a suspect or quasi-
suspect class in the future, but it will have a number of existing barri-
ers to overcome before doing so.264
256. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,321 (1993).
257. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1622, 1625, 1627, 1629.
258. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 459 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
259. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627; see also supra notes 205-13 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's failure to specify the proper level of scrutiny for classifications
based on homosexuality).
260. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627-29; see also supra notes 214-58 and accompanying
text (implying that the Court applied heightened rational basis review in Romer).
261. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 459 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court should have explicitly acknowledged that it
applied heightened scrutiny to classification involving the mentally retarded).
262. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Note, Principled Silence, 106 YALE L.J. 247, 250 (1996)
(citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,76 (1971)).
263. Id. at 250 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (characterizing Reed
as laying the groundwork for the Court's subsequent declaration that gender classifications
are quasi-suspect)).
264. For a discussion of the requirements of suspect and quasi-suspect classes, see su-
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Finally, the fourth ambiguity in the Romer opinion stems from
the Court's introduction of a novel "per se" standard for equal pro-
tection claims.265 The Court stated that Amendment 2 failed rational
relation review on two distinct bases:
First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing.
a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named
group, an exceptional and, as we shall explain, invalid form
of legislation. Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous
with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems
inexplicable by anything but animus towards the class it af-
fects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests.266
The second basis is the traditional rational relation test, as previously
discussed.267 The first basis, however, is unconventional and has no
direct support in prior case law.
The essence of the first basis is captured in the Court's state-
ment that "[a] law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult
for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the gov-
ernment is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most
literal sense. ,2' The Court further stated that "[c]entral both to the
idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution's guarantee of
equal protection is the principle that government and each of its
parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assis-
tance. ' ,269  The Court focused on the lack of precedent for an
amendment like Amendment 2 that "identifies a person by a single
trait and then denies them protection across the board. 2 70
In this portion of the opinion, the Court borrowed from an
amici curiae brief headed by Laurence Tribe, arguing that
pra notes 34-36, 48-50 and accompanying text. For a discussion of arguments regarding
whether homosexuals as a group may be considered a suspect or quasi-suspect class, see
supra note 208. For a discussion of the existing barriers to finding that gays are a suspect
or quasi-suspect class, see supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
265. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627-28.
266. Id. at 1627.
267. See supra notes 214-58 and accompanying text.
268. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added). The Court drew this proposition from
language in its precedents to the effect that "'[t]he guaranty of "equal protection of the
laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."' " Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535,541 (1942) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,369 (1886))).
269. Id. For support, the Court cited the proposition that "' [e]qual protection of the
laws is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities."' " Id. (quoting
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22
(1948))).
270. Id.
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"Amendment 2 is a rare example of a per se violation of the Equal
Protection Clause."271 The brief stated:
To decree that some identifying feature or characteristic of
a person or group may not be invoked as the basis of any
.claim of discrimination under any law or regulation en-
acted, previously or in the future, by the state, its agencies,
or its localities-when persons and groups not sharing this
characteristic are not similarly handicapped-is, by defini-
tion, to deny the "equal protection of the laws" to persons
having that characteristic.272
As such, there is no need to inquire "into the nature of the
rights that Amendment 2 might be thought to restrict, or of the class
it might be said to target. ''273 Professor Tribe further observed:
Amendment 2 is quite literally unprecedented: Between
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the en-
actment of Amendment 2, [the Supreme] Court has never
been presented with a decision by any state explicitly to
deny selected persons access to the protection of its laws
from a whole category of wrongful conduct. 4
If the Supreme Court intended this "per se" analysis to be a new
way to evaluate a legislative enactment or state constitutional
amendment, it did not expressly articulate it. Nevertheless, because
of the similarity between the language in Romer and that in Profes-
sor Tribe's brief, the Court appears to have adopted this "per se" test
as an alternative to the traditional three-tiered scrutiny. 75 This new
271. Brief of Laurence H. Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland,
and Kathleen M. Sullivan, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Romer (No. 94-
1039) [hereinafter Brief of Tribe et al.]. The amici, a group of constitutional law profes-
sors, submitted the brief "to present to the Court an argument in support of the judgment
below that is quite different from and more basic than the one relied upon by the Colorado
Supreme Court." Id. at 1.
272. Id. at 3-4. Furthermore, it stated:
Had Colorado explicitly declared some people within its jurisdiction completely
ineligible for the protection of its laws from some other form of mistreatment-
from robbery, for example, or blackmail, or any other wrongful infliction of
harm-no one would doubt that such discriminatory state action would "deny
[such persons] the equal protection of the laws," regardless of the rationale the
state might offer to defend it. Exactly the same holds true when some "person or
class of persons" is denied all access to legal protection from mistreatment in
which the wrong charged takes the form of discrimination as such.
Id. at 4 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 and COLO. CONST.
art. II, § 30b).
273. Id. at 3.
274. Id. at 13.
275. The Court found that Amendment 2 "defle[d]," see Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627, and
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inquiry essentially asks whether a classification makes it "more diffi-
cult for any one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from
the government."27
Although this argument for the invalidity of Amendment 2 is
powerful, Justice Scalia noted some of its deficiencies. The majority
claimed that "[t]he resulting disqualification of a class of persons
from the right to seek protection from the law is unprecedented in
our jurisprudence, 277 and that "[c]entral ... to our own Constitu-
tion's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government
and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek
its assistance., 27 8 Justice Scalia, however, offered as precedent the
Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which prohibited the
manufacture or sale of alcohol.2 9 Justice Scalia argued that those
who wished to drink or manufacture alcohol during Prohibition
could not alter the policy via local, state, or federal legislation or
even state constitutional amendment.280 In fact, he continued, while
the Eighteenth Amendment was in effect, no "part" of the govern-
ment was "open on impartial terms" to assist those who desired
alcohol, unless they could gain an amendment to the United States
Constitution.2u Justice Scalia found further examples in the state
constitutions of Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah,
which contain absolute prohibitions on polygamy.282 According to
Justice Scalia, "[p]olygamists, and those who have a polygamous
'orientation,' have been 'singled out' by these provisions for much
more severe treatment than merely denial of favored status; and that
treatment can only be changed by achieving amendment of the state
constitutions.,
21
"confound[ed]" the traditional process of equal protection review, see id. at 1628, hence
suggesting the necessity of an alternative inquiry, cf. id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(claiming that the Court "invent[ed] a novel and extravagant constitutional doctrine").
276. Id. at 1628.
277. Id.
278. Id. (emphasis added).
279. See id. at 1634-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting); U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
280. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1634-35. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia implied
that the Eighteenth Amendment surely did not deny such individuals equal protection. See
id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also pointed to the plight of monarchists who are
forced to live under a republican form of government which they could not overcome ex-
cept by constitutional amendment. See id. at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Again, he
implied that this was not a violation of equal protection. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
281. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
282. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra note 123 (providing excerpts from the
relevant portions of the state constitutions).
283. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia's arguments offered an effective challenge to the
Court's declaration that no historical precedent for Amendment 2
existed, and hence the dissenting Justice somewhat minimized the
force of the Court's proposition that "[t]he absence of precedent for
Amendment 2 is itself instructive."2" Although the Court did distin-
guish Davis v. Beason, which upheld a statute denying polygamists
the right to vote or hold office,285 the majority's failure to address the
other examples offered by the dissent left certain inconsistencies in
the Romer decision unchecked.286
Despite Justice Scalia's objections, the "per se" analysis does
appear to obviate the concern that the Court mistook "adherence to
traditional attitudes" for prejudice against homosexuals,287 because
the "per se" analysis "requires no benign or even neutral view of"
homosexuality." In addition, the "per se" analysis avoids the diffi-
cult issue of whether special rights are involved and operates
irrespective of the class that the legislation targets.289 It does have
other weaknesses, however, due to "the practical necessity that most
legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disad-
vantage to various groups or persons. ,290 The whole rationale behind
three-tiered scrutiny is to balance these inherent disadvantages
against the Fourteenth Amendment's principle that the laws will be
applied equally.2 1 Thus, because the "per se" standard involves no
balancing, the question remains whether it is repugnant to years of
equal protection jurisprudence.
Even so, the impact of this "per se" test on constitutional juris-
prudence is likely to be limited due to the "unprecedented" nature of
Amendment 2. If, as Laurence Tribe asserted, "[n]ever since the en-
actment of the Fourteenth Amendment has [the] Court confronted a
measure quite like Amendment 2-a measure that, by its express
terms, flatly excludes some of a state's people from eligibility for le-
284. Id. at 1628.
285. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333,347 (1890).
286. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (distinguishing Beason only).
287. Id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
288. Brief of Tribe et al., supra note 271, at 2 (acknowledging that "any characteristic
... can sometimes become the basis for deprivations that are prejudiced rather than justi-
fied," but explaining that the "per se" analysis requires no assessment of whether the
classification is based on prejudice).
289. See id. at 3 (noting that there is no need to inquire "into the nature of the rights
that Amendment 2 might be thought to restrict, or of the class it might be said to target").
290. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
291. See id.
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gal protection from a category of wrongs, 292 then the opportunities
in the future to draw upon Romer for its "per se" test would appear
to be rare. 93 The impact of Romer's rational relation analysis will
also likely be limited because of the Court's focus on the "sheer
breadth" of Amendment 2.294 Thus, for example, the Romer analysis
should have little effect on the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy, because that policy's breadth does not extend to "protections
against exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions
and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society.
2 95
The legacy of Romer likely will be (1) the inability to make it
more difficult for a particular group to seek specific protections from
the government;29 (2) the employment of a highly subjective and un-
substantiated tool to knock down state legislation: "the inevitable
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity";297 (3)
the introduction of an unprecedented "per se" test into equal protec-
tion jurisprudence; 298 (4) the continued existence of specious
"active" rational basis review;29' and (5) the possible foreshadowing
of homosexuals being declared a suspect or quasi-suspect class.y°
Unfortunately, however, Romer also resulted in the Court sub-
stituting its judgment for that of the people of Colorado, ignoring its
own precedent admonishing that "even improvident decisions will
eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial
intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely [the
Court] may think a political branch has acted."' ' If the Court had
adopted Justice Scalia's narrow interpretation of Amendment 2-
that the Amendment only prevented homosexuals from seeking
preferential treatment under the law3 -then it would have been
292. Brief of Tribe et al., supra note 271, at 3.
293. The Supreme Court, however, has already remanded a case to the Sixth Circuit
"for further consideration in light of Romer v. Evans." Equality Found. v. City of Cincin-
nati, 116 S. Ct. 2519,2519 (1996).
294. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
295. Id.; see 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)-(15) (1994) (outlining specific findings in support of
the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy within the context of military needs). See generally
Almeida, supra note 165, at 1013-15 (discussing the ease with which courts hold valid the
rationales of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy).
296. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
297. Id. at 1628; see supra notes 250-55 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 265-91 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 239-58 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 259-64 and accompanying text.
301. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (footnote omitted).
302. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 192-94
and accompanying text (summarizing Justice Scalia's "narrow" interpretation of Amend-
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easier for the Court to adhere to the advice that moral judgments
should be reserved to the people. 3 However, under the majority's
broad interpretation of Amendment 2-that homosexuals could only
seek protection from discrimination by amending the state constitu-
tion 34 - the Court had no choice but to become involved.
Romer may yet prove to be a landmark case for gay rights, much
in the same way that Reed v. Reed 05 has been for women's rights.3 6
Such an expansion of Romer, however, is not an outcome that the
decision logically requires. Unlike Reed, which involved the applica-
tion of a state statute in a specific context,07 the broad classification
at issue in Romer had a widespread, unprecedented impact on its
targeted class. 8 These unusual factors might result in Romer being
inapplicable in narrower contexts. If so, then Romer could eventu-
ally be seen as the high-water mark of judicial protection of
homosexuals under the Equal Protection Clause. On the other hand,
the Court's initial quote from Plessy v. Ferguson,319 its silence re-
garding Bowers v. Hardwick,31 0 and its arguable use of "active"
rational basis review. suggest that the Court may be willing to grant
ment 2).
303. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Baker v. Wade, 774 F.2d
1285, 1286-87 (5th Cir.), denying reh'g to 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985); see also supra note
231 (discussing the view that courts should always reserve moral judgments to the people).
304. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626-27; see also supra notes 189-91 and accompanying
text (summarizing the majority's "broad" interpretation of Amendment 2).
305. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
306. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (declaring that classifications
based on sex are quasi-suspect under the Equal Protection Clause, and recognizing Reed as
establishing the foundation for this declaration); see also supra notes 259-64 and accompa-
nying text (drawing an analogy between Romer and Reed).
307. See Reed, 404 U.S. at 72-73 (involving a state statute that gave preference to men
over women in appointing administrators of intestate estates).
30& The Romer Court repeatedly emphasized the "breadth" of Amendment 2. See
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1622, 1625, 1627, 1629; see also supra notes 245, 257 and accompany-
ing text (noting the Court's repeated references).
309. "One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the Consti-
tution 'neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.'" Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623
(quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). The fact
that the Court began its opinion with this quote from Plessy v. Ferguson may suggest that
the Court perceives homosexuals to be in the same position that African-Americans were
in one hundred years ago.
310. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (declining to recognize a fundamental right to privacy for
consensual homosexual conduct, and upholding state sodomy law as rationally related to
majoritarian sentiments about the morality of homosexuality); see also supra notes 224-32
(discussing the Romer Court's failure to mention Bowers).
311. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (finding that Amendment 2 raised an "inevitable
inference" of animosity toward homosexuals, but failing to cite any empirical evidence
supporting the inference); see also supra notes 250-55 and accompanying text (arguing
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suspect or quasi-suspect status to classifications based on homosexu-
ality if and when the need arises. If this result occurs, then Romer,
like Reed, surely will be seen as the turning point for the expansion
of gay rights under the Equal Protection Clause.
Regardless of the Romer opinion's ultimate significance, many
will view it as the product of an enlightened Court, while others will
see it merely as "terminal silliness." 2 Although this debate is certain
to continue for many years, one thing is for certain: Amendment 2,
by "deem[ing] a class of persons a stranger to its laws," violated the
Equal Protection Clause.3 "This Colorado cannot do.
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that, by drawing this inference, the Court deviated from traditional rational relation re-
view).
312. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
313. Id. at 1629.
314. Id.
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